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Abstract 
 
Small Businesses have been of recognized import to the Federal Government for 
many years.  This thesis explores the role of small business contractors in Air Force 
procurement and the effects of recent acquisition reform initiatives on their involvement, 
including their method of involvement (contract type), product areas in which they 
participate, and possible new areas of measurement. 
This thesis answers the research and investigative questions in three ways.  First, it 
explores the correlation of acquisition reform initiatives to small business participation as 
a whole, via selected contract types, and in selected product categories via causal 
regression models.  Next, it identifies trends in Air Force procurement via selected 
contract types in selected product categories via descriptive numerical comparison.  
Finally, it identifies possible product areas for improved small business recruitment. 
The results of this thesis are as varied as the methodologies employed to answer the 
research and investigative questions.  First, very little correlation was found between 
acquisition reform initiatives and small business participation.  Next, small business 
participation trends via the selected contract types in the selected product areas varied 
much greater than overall small business participation.  Finally, several product 
categories were identified as suffering from a decreasing level of small business 
participation. 
 
 
     v
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to express my appreciation to those whose assistance was indispensable 
in the completion of this thesis.  First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Patricia 
Luna, for her guidance and support and the other members of my thesis committee, Maj 
Michael Greiner, LtCol Tim Reed, and Ms. Teresa Rendon, for their ideas and feedback.  
Special thanks to Mr. David Pfister of the Defense Information Systems Agency, Dayton, 
OH; he lent his skill and expertise in collecting the data necessary to answer the research 
questions.  Many thanks go to the amazing team of professionals called the Small 
Business Integrated Process Team.  It was a pleasure to be a part of such an illustrious 
group of individuals.  Finally, I would like to thank Maj Daniel Holt of the Air Force 
Institute of Technology, Department of Systems and Engineering Management.  Though 
neither my academic advisor, nor even a signatory reader of this thesis, his expertise and 
counsel were pivotal to its successful completion.  
 
 Douglas E. Leedy 
 
 
 
     vi
Table of Contents 
 
 
  Page 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….. iv 
 
Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………..v 
 
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………. ix 
 
I.  Introduction……………………………………………………………………... 1-1 
 
 Background…………………………………………………………………….. 1-1 
 Problem Statement……………………………………………………………... 1-5 
 Research Objectives……………………………………………………………. 1-6 
 Research Scope………………………………………………………………… 1-7 
 Assumptions/Limitations………………………………………………………. 1-8 
 Thesis Structure………………………………………………………………... 1-8 
 
II.  Literature Review………………………………………………………………. 2-1 
 
 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….. 2-1 
 Small Business Assistance……………………………………………………... 2-1 
 Benefits to Using Small Business……………………………………………… 2-5 
  Small Businesses as a Source of Supply…………………………………… 2-5 
  Small Businesses as a Source of Innovation……………………………….. 2-6 
  Small Businesses as a Source of Economic Growth……………………….. 2-6 
 Acquisition Reform…………………………………………………………….. 2-7 
  The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act…………………… 2-8 
  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994………………………... 2-8 
  The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996…………………………………………… 2-9 
  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Rewrite…………………………… 2-10 
 Contract Bundling……………………………………………………………… 2-11 
 Government Reporting Methods………………………………………………..2-12 
  Quantitative Reporting……………………………………………………... 2-13 
  Strategic Planning & Reporting……………………………………………. 2-13 
 Types of Contracts……………………………………………………………... 2-15 
 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………... 2-17 
 
III.  Research Method……………………………………………………………… 3-1 
 
 Database Description…………………………………………………………... 3-1 
 Data Selection………………………………………………………………….. 3-2 
  Time Frame………………………………………………………………… 3-2 
 
     vii
   Page 
 
  Contract Types……………………………………………………………... 3-3 
  Product Types……………………………………………………………… 3-3 
 Method of Analysis…………………………………………………………….. 3-4 
  Standard Multiple Regression……………………………………………… 3-5 
  Time Series Analysis………………………………………………………. 3-6 
  Descriptive Numerical Comparison………………………………………... 3-7 
  Selected Methods…………………………………………………………... 3-7 
 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis………………………………………... 3-8 
  Dependent Variables……………………………………………………….. 3-8 
  Independent Variables……………………………………………………... 3-13 
  The Multiple Regression Model…………………………………………… 3-14 
  Hypotheses…………………………………………………………………. 3-15 
  Regression Analysis Techniques…………………………………………... 3-20 
 Descriptive Numerical Comparison……………………………………………. 3-22 
 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………... 3-22 
 
IV.  Data Analysis………………………………………………………………….. 4-1 
 
 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….. 4-1 
 Summary of Data………………………………………………………………. 4-1 
  Regression Data……………………………………………………………. 4-1 
  Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types Trend Data……….. 4-2 
  Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types by Product  
   Categories Trend Data…………………………………………………. 4-3 
 Results of Regression Analysis………………………………………………… 4-4 
  Regression Model y1...................................................................................... 4-5 
  Regression Model y2……………………………………………………….. 4-7 
  Regression Model y3……………………………………………………….. 4-9 
  Regression Model y4……………………………………………………….. 4-11 
  Regression Model y5……………………………………………………….. 4-13 
  Regression Model y6……………………………………………………….. 4-15 
  Regression Model y7……………………………………………………….. 4-17 
  Regression Model y8……………………………………………………….. 4-19 
  Regression Model y9……………………………………………………….. 4-21 
  Regression Model y10………………………………………………………. 4-22 
  Regression Model y11………………………………………………………. 4-24 
  Regression Model y12………………………………………………………. 4-26 
  Regression Model y13………………………………………………………. 4-28 
  Regression Model y14………………………………………………………. 4-30 
  Regression Model y15………………………………………………………. 4-32 
  Regression Model y16………………………………………………………. 4-34 
  Regression Model y17………………………………………………………. 4-36 
  Regression Model y18………………………………………………………. 4-38 
 
     viii
   Page 
 
  Regression Model y19………………………………………………………. 4-40 
  Regression Model y20………………………………………………………. 4-42 
  Regression Model y21………………………………………………………. 4-44 
  Regression Model y22………………………………………………………. 4-46 
  Regression Model y23………………………………………………………. 4-48 
  Regression Model y24………………………………………………………. 4-50 
  Regression Model y25………………………………………………………. 4-52 
  Regression Model y26………………………………………………………. 4-54 
  Regression Model y27………………………………………………………. 4-56 
  Regression Model y28………………………………………………………. 4-58 
  Regression Model y29………………………………………………………. 4-60 
  Regression Model y30………………………………………………………. 4-62 
  Regression Model y31………………………………………………………. 4-64 
  Regression Model y32………………………………………………………. 4-66 
  Regression Model y33………………………………………………………. 4-68 
  Regression Model y34………………………………………………………. 4-70 
  Regression Model y35………………………………………………………. 4-72 
  Regression Model y36………………………………………………………. 4-74 
  Regression Model y37………………………………………………………. 4-76 
  Regression Model y38………………………………………………………. 4-78 
  Regression Model y39………………………………………………………. 4-80 
  Testing the Hypotheses…………………………………………………….. 4-81 
 Results of the Trend Analysis………………………………………………….. 4-93 
  Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types Trends……………. 4-93 
  Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types by Product  
   Categories Trends……………………………………………………… 4-94 
 Summary……………………………………………………………………….. 4-103 
 
V.  Conclusion & Recommendations……………………………………………….5-1 
 
 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….. 5-1 
 Review of the Research Problem………………………………………………. 5-1 
 Discussion of Results…………………………………………………………... 5-2 
  Research Question 1……………………………………………………….. 5-2 
  Investigative Question 1…………………………………………………… 5-3 
  Investigative Question 1a…………………………………………………... 5-5 
  Investigative Question 1b………………………………………………….. 5-6 
  Research Question 2……………………………………………………….. 5-7 
 Contributions of the Research………………………………………………….. 5-10 
 Limitations of the Study………………………………………………………...5-10 
 Recommendations for Future Research………………………………………... 5-10 
 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………... 5-11 
 
 
     ix
   Page 
 
Appendix A:  Data Collection and Organization…………………………………... A-1 
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….. BIB-1 
 
Vita…………………………………………………………………………………. V-1 
 
 
     x
List of Tables 
 
Table     Page 
 
2-1 Small Business Legislation…………………………………………………... 2-4 
3-1 Product Categories…………………………………………………………… 3-4 
4-1 Summary Data for Regression Analysis……………………………………... 4-1 
4-2 SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types…………………………… 4-2 
4-3 SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Category 1…… 4-3 
4-4 SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Category 2…… 4-4 
4-5 SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Categories 
 3 & 4…………………………………………………………………………. 4-4 
4-6 Regression Analysis of Model y1…………………………………………….. 4-5 
4-7 Regression Analysis of Model y2…………………………………………….  4-7 
4-8 Regression Analysis of Model y3 ……………………………………………. 4-9 
4-9 Regression Analysis of Model y4…………………………………………….. 4-11 
4-10 Regression Analysis of Model y5…………………………………………….. 4-13 
4-11 Regression Analysis of Model y6…………………………………………….. 4-15 
4-12 Regression Analysis of Model y7…………………………………………….. 4-17 
4-13 Regression Analysis of Model y8…………………………………………….. 4-19 
4-14 Regression Analysis of Model y9…………………………………………….. 4-21 
4-15 Regression Analysis of Model y10…………………………………………….4-22 
4-16 Regression Analysis of Model y11…………………………………………….4-24 
4-17 Regression Analysis of Model y12…………………………………………….4-26 
4-18 Regression Analysis of Model y13…………………………………………….4-28 
4-19 Regression Analysis of Model y14…………………………………………….4-30 
4-20 Regression Analysis of Model y15…………………………………………….4-32 
4-21 Regression Analysis of Model y16…………………………………………….4-34 
4-22 Regression Analysis of Model y17…………………………………………….4-36 
4-23 Regression Analysis of Model y18…………………………………………….4-38 
4-24 Regression Analysis of Model y19…………………………………………….4-40 
4-25 Regression Analysis of Model y20…………………………………………….4-42 
4-26 Regression Analysis of Model y21…………………………………………….4-44 
4-27 Regression Analysis of Model y22…………………………………………….4-46 
4-28 Regression Analysis of Model y23…………………………………………….4-48 
4-29 Regression Analysis of Model y24…………………………………………….4-50 
4-30 Regression Analysis of Model y25…………………………………………….4-52 
4-31 Regression Analysis of Model y26…………………………………………….4-54 
4-32 Regression Analysis of Model y27…………………………………………….4-56 
4-33 Regression Analysis of Model y28…………………………………………….4-58 
4-34 Regression Analysis of Model y29…………………………………………….4-60 
4-35 Regression Analysis of Model y30…………………………………………….4-62 
4-36 Regression Analysis of Model y31…………………………………………….4-64 
4-37 Regression Analysis of Model y32…………………………………………….4-66 
4-38 Regression Analysis of Model y33…………………………………………….4-68 
 
     xi
      Page 
 
4-39 Regression Analysis of Model y34…………………………………………….4-70 
4-40 Regression Analysis of Model y35…………………………………………….4-72 
4-41 Regression Analysis of Model y36…………………………………………….4-74 
4-42 Regression Analysis of Model y37…………………………………………….4-76 
4-43 Regression Analysis of Model y38…………………………………………….4-78 
4-44 Regression Analysis of Model y39…………………………………………….4-80 
4-45 Small Business Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types………………. 4-93 
4-46 SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Category 1…… 4-94 
4-47 SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Category 2…… 4-98 
4-48 SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Categories 
 3 & 4…………………………………………………………………………. 4-102 
5-1 SB Participation Trends (FY1990 thru FY2003)…………………………….. 5-8 
 
 
      
 
 
 1-1   
SMALL BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT: 
PARTICIPATION TRENDS AND THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITION REFORM 
INITIATIVES ON AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT VIA SELECTED CONTRACT 
TYPES IN SELECTED PRODUCT CATEGORIES 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
The benefits of small businesses to the national economy have been recognized for 
some time.  Acs (1992) best summarized these benefits by stating that small businesses 
inject innovation into the marketplace, provide a mechanism for market regeneration, 
promote international competition through newly created niches, and create a 
preponderant share of new jobs.  This section outlines the background of small business 
legislation, presidential support, effects to small business participation in government 
procurement, government small business participation goals, and the role of the Air Force 
Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization. 
Given the recognized benefits of small businesses, legislation has been crafted to 
promote small business through the Small Business Act and the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958.  These acts were later amended in 1978 by Public Law 95-507, 
which stated that it was the goal of the Government to provide the “maximum practicable 
opportunities” to small businesses in its acquisitions and directed that each agency 
establish an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization.  In 1988, The 
Business Opportunity Development Reform Act (Public Law 100-656) set forth the first 
quantifiable government-wide small business goal; it stated that the federal government 
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must expend 20% of its procurement budget with small businesses.  This goal was later 
increased to 23% by the Small Business Administration (SBA) Reauthorization Act of 
1999 (United States Congress, 1999). 
In conjunction with these laws, the executive branch has reinforced the desire to 
select small business contractors via executive orders that sought to streamline 
acquisition processes, thereby making it easier for more small businesses to participate, 
and promote small business solicitation.  Executive Order (EO) 12866, Regulatory 
Planning and Review, emphasized efficiency in government by defining a “Regulatory 
Philosophy,” which directed federal agencies to draft regulations only as they are 
“required by law…or are made necessary by compelling public need…”  This EO also 
directed that “each agency shall tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on 
society, including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities…” 
(Clinton, 1993).  EO 12928 more explicitly called for small business involvement by 
directing federal procurement agencies to turn to small businesses owned by 
economically and socially disadvantaged individuals. 
The practice of ensuring small business involvement in government’s acquisition 
process has been echoed in the current administration.  President George W. Bush 
supports several initiatives designed to aid small businesses and small business 
employees, such as changes in tax laws which would simplify tax accounting procedures 
for small businesses, better health benefits for small business employees, and 
strengthened small business assistance programs.  Also, he has directed agencies to 
ensure that recent initiatives designed to reform and improve the government 
procurement process do not exclude small businesses (The White House, 2003).  
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President Bush recognizes that the strength of our country and economy “depends upon 
the strength of the small business community all across America.” (Bush, 2003)   
Despite this attention, many have suggested that efforts to involve small businesses 
are overcome by initiatives to transform the government’s procurement process.  One 
recent initiative that is perceived to exclude small business participation is the practice of 
encouraging agencies to combine multiple similar requirements onto a single contract as 
a means to reduce administrative burdens.  Contract bundling, as this practice has been 
termed, may lead to a disproportionately low number of small businesses that are able to 
compete for federal contracts configured in this manner (Murphy, 2003).  Small 
businesses, while able to perform many different jobs on a small scale, are sometimes 
unable to perform the same jobs on a large scale.  Large businesses can more easily scale 
their level of effort across a broader range and are able to compete on either small or 
large jobs (SBA Advocacy Report, 2000).  Contract bundling has been blamed for the 
23% decrease in the number of contracts awarded to small businesses from 1997 to 2000 
(Contract Bundling: How it Hurts Small Business, 2003). 
Thus, government leaders are continually struggling to balance the call to involve 
small businesses with the goal of making procurement process improvements.  
Legislation and initiatives such as the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation Rewrite attempted to both update the federal 
procurement process and restructure the workforce that implements federal procurement 
programs.  The effects of these efforts, however, may negatively impact federal small 
business programs. 
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In addition to the overall small business goal of 23 percent, Congress sets agency 
goals for procurement with several subsets of small businesses to include small 
disadvantaged businesses, women-owned small businesses, small businesses in 
Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUB Zones), and small businesses owned by 
service-disabled veterans.  Besides formulating and administrating agency programs, 
agency SADBU offices work closely with the SBA to establish annual agency-specific 
program goals (What We Do, 2002). 
The Air Force established their Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business 
Utilization to improve small business involvement and to track small business 
participation in AF contracting.  The director of the Air Force Office of Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Utilization, Mr. Joseph Diamond, outlined his office’s efforts in 
his Air Force Small Business and Historically Black Colleges and Universities/Minority 
Institutions Program Plan for Fiscal Years 2003-2007.  The strategic plan includes goals 
and initiatives designed to improve small business and HBCU/MI participation in AF 
contracting, develop a small business education and training program, and enhance the 
effectiveness of their programs through the use of data and analysis (Diamond, 2002). 
As mandated by Congress, the AF SADBU office primarily measures small business 
involvement as Congress established it: percentage of total obligations directly awarded 
to small businesses.  However, there is some question as to whether this method of 
measuring small business involvement is the most appropriate measure, given the 
complexities of the procurement system and the myriad of goods and services purchased.  
Thus the Director of Air Force Small Business Utilization Office created a Data and 
Analysis Integrated Product Team (hereafter referred to as the IPT) as part of a goal to 
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enhance the effectiveness of the Air Force Small Business Program (AFSBP). With its 
mix of multi-level small business utilization experts and researchers, the IPT was 
specifically suited to tackle goal four of the small business strategic plan, which was to 
use data analysis to identify trends in small business participation and identify targets of 
opportunity for improvement (Diamond, 2002).   
One project in particular that the IPT set out to investigate was a better understanding 
of small business participation in Air Force procurement via two contract types, Firm 
Fixed-Price and Indefinite Delivery.  A further breakout by four product areas within 
both contract types was also determined by the IPT.  The four product areas included: 
supplies & equipment, services & leases, construction, and research & development. 
This thesis will augment the Air Force Small Business Program’s primary measure, 
percent-of-total-obligations, by exploring the extent to which two of its components, 
namely, contract type and industry areas, offer insights into small business involvement. 
By identifying the level, history, and trend of small business involvement in the product 
areas via the contract types, this thesis will assist the Air Force in developing small 
business utilization and development efforts. 
Problem Statement 
The extent to which the current AFSBP small business participation measure, 
percent-of-total-obligations, lends insight into the health of the program or the nuances of 
small business participation is not known.  AFSBP leadership suggests that this measure 
neither provides adequate insight, nor reflects the true involvement of small business 
participation in Air Force procurement.  Additional areas of measurement that have been 
proposed, but not previously researched include the capture of possible trends in both the 
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method by which the Air Force procures with small businesses (contract type) and the 
industries in which small businesses compete.  A second area of research of particular 
interest to acquisition and small business leadership raises the question of whether 
acquisition reforms have had any impact on small business participation.  As a 
heightened emphasis on improved efficiencies and consolidated buys becomes a central 
focus of the Federal Government and, specifically, the Department of Defense, the 
question remains what impact, if any, have these reforms had on small business 
participation? 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to determine if acquisition reform initiatives affected a 
change in Air Force small business utilization.  Specifically, to answer the following 
research questions: 
1. Have acquisition reform initiatives had an impact on small business 
utilization?  More specifically, have acquisition reforms affected a change in 
the use of procurement vehicles by the Air Force?  If so, what has been the 
impact to small business utilization? 
2. What alternative measures of small business participation can be employed to 
effectively evaluate performance outside of percentage of total obligations?   
Beyond the overall research questions, this study will also answer the following 
investigative questions: 
1. Have acquisition reform initiatives affected a change in the Air Force’s use of 
contract types to procure goods and services in selected product categories? 
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a. To what extent has the Air Force used firm fixed-price contracts (C-type) 
& indefinite delivery (D-type) contracts to procure goods and services 
from small businesses between the years of 1990 to present?  Analyzing 
trends in small business participation via these contract types may lead to 
a better understanding of small business participation preferences, which 
could lead to more focused efforts of small business participation 
strategies.   
b. To what extent has the Air Force used firm fixed-price (C-type) contracts 
& indefinite delivery (D-type) contracts to procure goods and services in 
selected product categories from small businesses between the years of 
1990 to present?    Analyzing trends in small business participation via 
these contract types within specific product areas may lead to a better 
understanding of small business ability and participation preferences, 
which could lead to more focused efforts of small business participation 
strategies.   
Research Scope 
This study will be accomplished in two phases.  First it will research and identify 
applicable small business legislation and acquisition reform initiatives.  Then, it will 
collect the data required for analysis of the research and investigative questions.  The 
primary source of data will be that collected from contract awards and contained in the 
Air Forces’ J001 Database of Procurement Actions; specifically, data which were 
reported by each Air Force contracting organization via the Department of Defense form 
350 (DD350), Individual Contracting Action Report, will be used.  Every contract action 
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over $25,000 is required to be reported via a DD350 and included in this database.  Each 
contract award dated between October 1, 1989 and September 30, 2003 (Fiscal Years 
1990 through 2003) will be copied from the database, to include data for each action as 
related to its date of award, amount of award, type of entity receiving the award, type of 
contract vehicle upon which it was awarded, and stock class under which the purchased 
item or service was categorized. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
Although the J001 is the most comprehensive of all Air Force contract reporting 
databases, changes in regulation and policy during the period may have resulted in 
missing or incomplete data.  This study will be limited to only those actions containing 
each data point under study; only those reported actions containing an entity type, a 
contract type, and a stock class will be analyzed. 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide background on the AF Small Business Program 
and discuss literature relating to the research objectives, including the importance of 
small business, acquisition reform and small business legislation, product areas, and 
contract typology.  Chapter 3 will discuss the research methodologies employed.  Chapter 
4 will provide data analysis and results.  Chapter 5 will provide conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews applicable literature relating to the successful investigation of 
the research questions.  Specifically discussed will be the regulatory history of small 
business assistance, the benefits to using small businesses, acquisition reform initiatives, 
contract bundling, types of contracts, and government reporting methods. 
Small Business Assistance 
Government-wide small business assistance began with the Small Business Act of 
1953.  This Act was not the first legislation to recognize the importance of small 
businesses to the national economy.  However, previous legislation, such as the Small 
Business Mobilization Act of 1942 and the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 
recognized the importance of small businesses, but mainly as means of maintaining a 
strong industrial base in support of war efforts (United States Congress, 1942 and United 
States Congress, 1947).  It was not until the Small Business Act that congress established 
a formal support mechanism for small businesses, The Small Business Administration 
(United States Congress, 2001). 
  The Small Business Act of 1953, as enacted, contained several key provisions.  
Primarily, it directed the SBA to provide several types of assistance to small businesses, 
including technical and management assistance, loans, and assistance in obtaining 
government contracts.  The Act also authorized the SBA to co-sign federal contracts with 
small minority firms and directed efforts that would lead to small business participation 
in larger government contracts as subcontractors.  (United States Congress, 2001) 
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In the years since 1953, Congress has made many revisions to the Small Business 
Act.  Most notable among the revisions were additional provisions that required large 
businesses award government contracts to provide small businesses subcontracting 
opportunities (Subcontracting Opportunities, 2003).  Additional revisions established a 
program for small business loan guarantees (United States Congress, 1974 and United 
States Congress, 1976), quantitative small business utilization goals, and the 
establishment of offices in each agency that oversee small business utilization efforts 
(referred to as Offices of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, or  SADBU) 
(United States Congress, 1978).  All of this legislation reflects congressional 
acknowledgment of the Federal Government's role in supporting a strong small business 
base, but it was the latter two initiatives (small business goals and the establishment of 
agency SADBU offices) which seem to have had the greatest impact on small business 
utilization efforts. 
The establishment of a Federal goal for small business participation in its 
procurements was first stated in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 as simply 
"a fair proportion" and was reaffirmed in the Small Business Act of 1953.  It was not 
until 1978, however, that Congress directed Federal agencies to establish more explicit 
small business utilization goals (United States Congress, 1978).  This was further refined 
in 1988 when Congress specified that a quantifiable percentage, 20%, of total federal 
procurement dollars must be spent with small businesses(United States Congress, 1988).  
Then, in 1999, Congress increased the Federal agency small business goal to 23%. 
(United States Congress, 1999)  
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In the SBA, Congress created an agency to aid national small business growth.  The 
SBA does this through various programs including loan guarantees, a minority small 
business program, a venture capital program, and more.  Between fiscal years 1991 and 
2000, the SBA brokered over $94 billion in loans to almost 435,000 small businesses.  In 
fact, the SBA could be considered the largest single financial backer of businesses in the 
country with over 219,000 current loans worth more than $45 billion. (Overview and 
History of the SBA, 2004)  The guiding principles of the SBA include supporting 
entrepreneurs through a vast network of resource partners, facilitating an environment 
necessary for small business success, and, most importantly, measuring SBA 
performance by small business success (SBA’s Guiding Principles, 2004). 
The Air Force Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization was created to 
implement small business utilization efforts at the Air Force level.  The leadership at the 
AF-OSDBU has developed three primary goals in its strategic plan as follows: 1) 
promote outreach efforts to encourage and assist small businesses; 2) promote acquisition 
policies and procedures that provide maximum opportunity for small business 
involvement in AF procurements; and 3) implement an organized system for planning, 
executing, and measuring the effectiveness of AF small business programs (Small 
Business (SB), 2003).  
The legislation discussed above and detailed in Table 2-1 review the foundation of 
small business involvement in Government procurement.  The next section will review 
the various benefits to procuring from small businesses. 
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Table 2-1: Small Business Legislation 
Small Business Legislation Key Points 
Small Business Mobilization 
Act of 1942 
- Authorized small business price differential during 
wartime 
 
Armed Services Procurement 
Act of 1947 
- Declared that a “fair proportion” of Federal 
purchases must be made with small businesses 
 
Small Business Act of 1953 - Created the SBA 
- Authorized the SBA to make guaranteed loans to 
small businesses 
- Directed the SBA to provide small businesses with 
technical and management assistance 
- Authorized the SBA to enter into contracts with 
Federal agencies and subcontract 100% of the 
effort with small businesses 
- Directed the SBA to assist small businesses in 
obtaining government contracts 
 
Revision to the Small Business 
Act of 1953 (1978) 
- Required Federal agencies to establish small 
business procurement goals 
- Required small business subcontracting goals for 
Federal contracts awarded to small businesses 
- Reserved all Federal contract awards under 
$25,000 for small businesses 
- Required establishment of agency Offices of Small 
and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU) 
 
Business Opportunity 
Development Reform Act of 
1988 
 
- Required Federal agencies to expend 20% of its 
procurement budget with small businesses 
 
Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994 
- Established micro-purchases and the Simplified 
Acquisition Threshold 
- Reserved all Federal contract awards between 
$2,500 and $100,000 for small businesses 
 
SBA Reauthorization Act of 
1999 
- Required Federal agencies to expend 23% of its 
procurement budget with small businesses 
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Benefits to Using Small Business 
There are many benefits to the Federal Government using small businesses as a 
source of supplies and services.  There are benefits to using them as a source of supply, 
as a source of innovation, and as a source of economic growth.  This section will review 
these benefits.  
Small Businesses as a Source of Supply 
As a part of national industry, small businesses are believed to be an important part of 
defense mobilization.  In 1942 Congress recognized that small businesses may not be 
able to compete effectively against large businesses and enacted legislation allowing for a 
small business price differential, which basically stated that it was acceptable for the 
Government to procure goods and services from small businesses at a higher cost than if 
procured from large businesses.  The primary goal of this early legislation was to 
“mobilize aggressively the productive capacity of all small business concerns, and to 
determine the means by which such concerns can be most efficiently and effectively 
utilized to augment war production.” (United States Congress, 1942).  In 1953, with the 
passage of The Small Business Act, legislators recognized that small businesses should 
be continuously primed for possible DoD utilization (United States Congress, 2001). 
To this day, Small businesses continue to be an important source of supply for the 
Federal Government.  In fact, many federal agencies exceed the mandated 23% small 
business procurement goal.  During Fiscal Year 2002, 21 agencies exceeded 50% and 
two agencies purchased 100% of their goods and services from small businesses (Biglow, 
2003).  Clearly, small businesses can effectively support the procurement needs of the 
Government.  
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Small Businesses as a Source of Innovation 
Technological innovation is not limited to large businesses.  In fact, Acs (1988) found 
that small firms enjoy a larger per employee rate of innovative activity (new patent 
filings, etc.) than large firms.  Innovation in small firms, however, is limited by the 
resources which the small businesses can employ (Acs, 1992).  It is these resources that 
government programs, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, 
provide.  The SBIR, passed into law under the Small Business Innovation Development 
Act of 1982, established guidelines for exploiting and growing the innovative talents of 
small businesses.  It was designed to stimulate technological innovation and increase 
small business participation in federally-funded research and development efforts. 
(United States Congress, 1982)    
Small Businesses as a Source of Economic Growth 
Small businesses act as more than suppliers and as more than sources of innovation; 
they are a key component of the national economy.  Small businesses employ half of all 
private sector employees, generate 60 to 70 percent of net new jobs annually, and employ 
39 percent of high tech workers (Office of Advocacy, 2003).  By ensuring their 
preference as a source of supply, small business programs improve the performance of 
new ventures and increase economic development (Chrisman and McMullan, 1996).  
Programs, such as those that sponsor innovation, create demand for new categories of 
goods or increase demand for existing categories of goods (Chrisman and McMullan, 
2002).  Terleckyj supports this view by stating that new, small, innovative firms 
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eventually grow to be large and, along the way, aid the emergence of new industries 
(Terleckyj, 1999). 
It is in the above ways that the benefits to small business utilization are realized.  The 
next section will discuss recent reform initiatives designed to update and streamline the 
manner in which the Federal government procures. 
Acquisition Reform 
For the Federal Government, the 1990s was the decade of acquisition reform.  After 
over two centuries of growth and change, the federal procurement process had become 
mired in the weight of its own policies, rules, and procedures.  In 1994 the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform testified to the House Committee on Small 
Business that the combined result of these many years of legislative and regulatory 
changes has resulted in a procurement system that is too complex and too cumbersome 
(The ABC’s of Acquisition Reform, 1995).  The efforts to change and streamline federal 
acquisition processes are known as acquisition reform.  
The efforts of Congress during this period are well documented in the three primary 
pieces of acquisition reform legislation: The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994 (FASA), The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and The Defense Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA).  This legislation also eventually brought on Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) rewriting initiatives.  DAWIA restructured and outlined 
training requirements for the federal acquisition workforce.  FASA directed the first true 
acquisition policy changes of the era and the Clinger-Cohen Act followed-up the policy 
changes with new tools needed to do the job.  FAR rewriting initiatives attempted to 
incorporate and implement the aforementioned changes in law. 
   
 2-8   
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
Perhaps the first of the era's acquisition reform initiatives was the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA).  The act recognized the importance 
of those that manage and implement acquisition programs.  In essence, acquisition 
program success is contingent on the abilities of the employees.  DAWIA's goal was to 
improve the effectiveness of acquisition personnel and, thereby, improve the quality of 
acquisition programs (Garcia et. al., 1997).  Specifically, the act identified twelve civilian 
and military acquisition career fields for which the Secretary of Defense was required to 
establish education, training, and experience requirements (DAWIA, 2003). 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 
FASA has been termed "revolutionary" for its impact on the federal acquisition 
process (Chart of Laws that Effect Contracting, 2003).  It had three main goals: 1) reduce 
the time and cost to procure goods and services; 2) reduce the purchase price of procured 
goods and services; and 3) assure that the Government utilizes the best technology and 
methods to meet its procurement needs.  In the furtherance of these goals, FASA 
modified or repealed over 225 procurement statutes.  (United States Congress, 1994) 
Most relevant to Federal Government small business utilization efforts was FASA's 
changes to small business procurement thresholds.  Prior to FASA, all acquisitions were 
termed either small purchases or large purchases, with the pivot value being $25,000.  
Small purchases were specifically reserved for small businesses.  FASA redefined 
government purchases to fall under two thresholds: $2,500 and the Simplified 
Acquisition Threshold (SAT) (normally $100,000).  Those purchases $2,500 or less were 
termed Micro-Purchases and were exempted from competition and business size 
   
 2-9   
requirements.  Purchases valued between $2,500 and SAT were accomplished using new 
Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) and were specifically set-aside for small 
businesses.  All purchases greater than SAT remained under “full and open” competition 
rules (United States Congress, 1994). 
Also newly authorized by FASA was a procurement vehicle known as a multiple 
award contract (MAC).  A MAC is a task- or delivery-order contract whereby the 
procuring agency contracts with multiple vendors for the same or similar products.  This 
contract vehicle was designed to increase purchasing flexibility and decrease 
administrative workload (Hecker, 2001). 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
The Clinger-Cohen Act was the combination of the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA).  It primarily 
focused on the increased use of information technology (IT) in streamlining government 
acquisition, such as overall agency IT investment, Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data 
Interchange, and the repeal of outdated and burdensome Federal IT legislation enacted 
under the Brooks Act (Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 2003 and Fedchak, 2003).  Other 
provisions in the Act specify decentralized procurement authority, the role of Chief 
Information Officers, pilot programs, and modular contracting (Fedchak, 2003). 
A little known provision of the Clinger-Cohen Act authorized the use of multi-agency 
indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts.  These contracts are commonly 
referred to as government-wide agency contracts (GWAC).  This provision authorized 
any government agency (such as DoD) to purchase goods and services from a contract let 
by another agency (such as GSA).  Small business proponents believe that this 
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consolidation of purchasing power represents a lack of competition and could reduce the 
ability of small businesses to compete for federal contract dollars (Fedchak, 2003).   
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Rewrite 
During the period of acquisition reform, legislation enacted by Congress directed 
many changes in acquisition policy and law.  These changes sparked a rewrite of the 
instructions used to guide contracting officers as they purchase goods and services.  
Besides updating the regulation to reflect changes in law, FAR rewrite efforts were 
designed to encourage innovation in contracting practices and eliminate the idea that if a 
practice was not expressly permitted, it was prohibited (Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) Changes, 2003).  In other words, the revision was intended to allow for flexibility 
and innovation in the contracting process itself. 
Accompanying the FAR rewrite, agencies updated and streamlined their own 
supplements to the regulations.  For example, between 1996 and 2002, the Air Force 
reduced the page count of its supplement. This reduction was designed to accomplish 
three main goals: 1) eliminate unnecessary regulation, overly-detailed procedures, and 
outdated information; 2) emphasize an agile acquisition philosophy; and 3) empower the 
Air Force acquisition community with new designations and delegations.  These changes 
aimed to give the contracting officer flexibility in daily decisions by encouraging 
innovation instead of discouraging practices not expressly authorized. (James, 2002)  
Industry was skeptical of the benefits of these regulation rewrites.  They believed that 
the increased discretion afforded acquisition personnel could lead to the "suppression of 
competitive market forces."  Specifically, they cite acquisition reform initiatives, such as 
the FAR rewrite, which elevate efficiency over fairness.  Paramount was industry's 
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concern that the rewrite would allow acquisition personnel subjective decisions in their 
evaluation of such things as competitive range, a determination which could allow the 
arbitrary rejection of bids.  (HHGFAA, Allies Testify on FAR Rewrite, 1997)  
Contract Bundling 
Although not officially an acquisition reform initiative or a practice resulting from 
acquisition reform legislation, contracting bundling is a practice carried out in the spirit 
of streamlining the acquisition process.  Contract bundling is a process whereby a single 
agency would “bundle” the requirements of several agencies, request bids for the bundled 
requirements, then award a single contract to one contractor under which multiple 
agencies could place orders.  This process eliminates the duplication of effort which has 
traditionally been the case when individual agencies solicit, award, and administer their 
own contracts for the same effort. 
Primary of opponents' arguments is that contract bundling unfairly excludes small 
businesses from competing for work which they could otherwise perform (Hecker, 2001).  
The practice effects this exclusion by its very nature.  A bundled contract is the 
consolidation of two or more requirements for similar goods or services made unsuitable 
for award to a small business due to its large scope or geographical separation of 
performance sites (United States Congress, 1999).   
Contract bundling is perceived by some as a contributing factor to a 
disproportionately fewer number of small businesses that are able to compete for federal 
contracts configured in this manner and has been blamed for the 23% decrease in the 
number of contracts awarded to small businesses from 1997 to 2000 (Contract Bundling: 
How it Hurts Small Business, 2003 and Murphy, 2003).  This possible effect to small 
   
 2-12   
business participation has garnered contract bundling much attention in the acquisition 
reform era.   
The increased use of contract bundling has been linked to acquisition personnel's 
desire to decrease their workload and the creation of acquisition reform initiatives 
designed to streamline both the acquisition workforce and acquisition procedures.  
Research suggests that contract bundling can, in fact, lower total costs and improve 
service.  It results in the contractor's more effective use of employees and better 
coordination among related activities, which results in a lower overall price, higher 
customer satisfaction, and a greater consistency in service (Bundled Services: A 
Framework for Cutting Costs, Improving Performance, and Supporting Small Businesses, 
2001).   
A bundled contract, however, may simply be too much work for a small business to 
perform.  Small businesses, while able to perform many different jobs on a small scale, 
are sometimes unable to perform the same jobs on a large scale.  Large businesses can 
more easily scale their level of effort across a broader range and are able to compete on 
either small or large jobs (SBA Advocacy Report Finds Contract Bundling Hurts Small 
Business, 2000).  
Government Reporting Methods 
Government agencies report both the quantitative results of their procurements and 
the qualitative assessment of their procurement programs.  The quantitative data is 
compiled by the Federal Procurement Data Center (FPDC).  The qualitative strategic 
plans are submitted and reviewed in accordance with the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993. 
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Quantitative Reporting 
Automated Federal procurement data collection began in 1978 as a result of the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act.  The Act established the FPDC as the central 
collection point for Federal procurement data and directed the construction of the Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS), the first fully automated database of federal 
procurement actions.  The FPDC compiles and summarizes procurement data in its yearly 
Federal Procurement Data Report (FPDR).  The FPDR is considered “a reliable basis for 
measuring and assessing the impact of Federal acquisition policy and management 
improvement.”  (Biglow, 2003) 
Strategic Planning and Reporting 
It was not until Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993 that Federal agencies were required to submit and report the results of strategic 
plans to Congress.  Prior to the Act, Federal managers were considered disadvantaged in 
their efforts to improve program efficiency and Congress was considered handicapped in 
their policymaking by inattention to program performance (United States Congress, 
1993).   
Under the Act, the head of each agency is required to submit a yearly strategic plan 
for their programs’ activities.  The Act requires each strategic plan to include six main 
sections as follows: 
- Section 1: A mission statement and description of the major functions of the 
agency. 
 - Section 2: A list of outcome-related goals and objectives the major functions of 
the agency. 
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- Section 3: A description of how the agency’s goals and objectives will be 
achieved, including processes, technology, information, and personnel. 
- Section 4: A description of how the performance goals of the agency relate to its 
general goals. 
- Section 5: A description of key external factors beyond the control of the agency 
which could significantly the success of the agency’s goals. 
- Section 6: A description of the program evaluations used in determining the 
agency’s goals, including a schedule for future evaluations. 
Also under the Act, each agency is required to submit a yearly performance plan.  
Each performance plan must: 1) establish performance goals for each program; 2) express 
the performance goals in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable manner; 3) describe 
the processes, skills, technology, and resources necessary to meet the performance goals; 
4) establish performance indicators to be used in measuring or assessing the relevant 
outcomes of each activity; 5) provide a basis for comparing actual program results with 
the established performance goals; and 6) describe the method to be used to verify and 
validate measured values.   
Finally, the Act requires the head of each agency to submit a yearly program 
performance report.  Each performance report is required to review actual program 
results and report the following: 1) the success of achieving the performance goals of the 
fiscal year; 2) an evaluation of the performance plan for the current fiscal year; and 3) an 
explanation and description of where performance goals were not met, including why the 
goal was not met, plans and schedules for meeting the goal, and an opinion of whether 
the performance goal is impractical or infeasible. 
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In 2001, the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 
Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations heard testimony on the status 
and perception of the implementation and success of the Act. Witnesses testified on the 
shortcomings of the Act, including: “the inability to assess an agency’s performance, the 
inability to compare programs across government, inadequate data on performance, and 
unwillingness among agencies to set goals to resolve long-standing problems.”  The 
process of agencies learning the intricacies of the Act and its reporting requirements are 
ongoing and, “until GPRA is integrated into the authorization and appropriation process, 
progress will probably remain at glacial speed.”  The committee was warned, however, 
not to turn GPRA into a “technical exercise.” (House Government Reform Subcommittee 
on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, 
2001) 
The GPRA became a critical tool in determining the results of agency programs and 
Federal policy (United States General Accounting Office, 2002).  It did this by shifting 
the focus of decision making away from the intricacies of specific activities towards the 
results of those activities.  Combined, these two aspects of reporting, quantitative and 
qualitative, reinforce one another and provide the tools necessary to correct the inherent 
defects of Federal funding practices prior to the Act (The Results Act: Turning 
Washington on its Head by making Federal Programs Accountable for Results, 2004). 
Types of Contracts 
Through multiple legislative acts, Congress established specific guidelines for the 
expenditure of discretionary appropriated funds.  These guidelines in law are codified in 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) along with rules established by Executive 
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departments and agencies.  Title 48 of the CFR, Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 
organizes the laws and guidelines into the cornerstone Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and its agency supplements, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) and the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(AFFARS).  This section reviews the basic requirements of FAR part 16, Types of 
Contracts. (GPO, 2002a) 
FAR part 16 outlines the use of many different types and sub-types of contracts, 
commonly referred to as “contract types”.  These contract types fit into seven categories, 
grouped by general use and administration.  The contract categories outlined in the FAR 
are fixed-price, cost-reimbursement, incentive, indefinite delivery, time-and-materials, 
labor-hour, and agreements. (GPO, 2002c) 
DoD agency contracting offices report their contract awards via forms that further 
categorize award actions.  Awards are reported in procurement categories according to 
the procurement method (contract type), stage in the procurement (e.g. letter contracts), 
and agency association (e.g. orders against Federal schedules).  At their highest level of 
categorization, actions are reported as letter contracts, definitive contracts, orders under 
agreements, orders under indefinite-delivery contracts, orders under federal schedules, 
BPA orders under federal schedules, orders from UNICOR or JWOD, or awards under 
FAR Part 12. (GPO, 2002c) 
Each contract awarded by Federal agencies is labeled with a contract number.  This 
number identifies the awarding contracting office and agency, the type of contract, and a 
contract-specific serial identifier.  For the DoD, each action is labeled with a Procurement 
Instrument Identification Number (PIIN).  Within each award PIIN is single digit 
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identifier specifying the type of action being awarded (e.g. C-type or D-type) (GPO, 
2002b).  These identifiers related specifically to the categories of contract types identified 
above.   
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed literature relating to the investigation of the research questions.  
Specifically, this chapter discussed the regulatory history of small business assistance, the 
benefits to using small businesses, acquisition reform initiatives, contract bundling, types 
of contracts, and government reporting methods.  Chapter 3 will outline the methodology 
employed in answering the research questions. 
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III.  Research Method 
 
This chapter explains the method that will be used to analyze the data.  Specifically, it 
will describe the database from which the data were collected, the specific data selected, 
possible methods of analysis, and descriptions of the methods used. 
Database Description 
The data were compiled from the Air Force Contract Reporting System (AFCRS), 
more commonly referred to as the J001 Database of Procurement Actions.  The J001 is 
the Air Force warehouse for reportable contract action data.  DoD-wide data is further 
collected in the Defense Contract Action Data System (DCADS) prior to its transmission 
to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), which is maintained by the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) (Department of the Air Force, 2000).   
Based upon the data transmitted to it, the J001 includes both summary and action-
specific data fields.  It includes action-specific data fields for all actions valued greater 
than $25,000 and summary data fields for actions valued $25,000 or less.  Contracting 
organizations report their contract award data via two DoD forms, the DD Form 350, 
Individual Contracting Action Report (DD350), and the DD Form 1057, Monthly 
Procurement Summary of Actions $25,000 or Less (DD1057) (Department of the Air 
Force, 2000).  The DD350 is used to report individual contract award actions valued 
greater than $25,000 and includes many details of the contract action.  The DD1057, 
however, is a periodic summary report (normally submitted monthly), cumulating less 
detailed procurement data than the DD350.  Via these two forms, each contracting 
organization transmits all of its available contract award data to the J001. 
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As the primary warehouse for Air Force procurement data, the J001 houses a massive 
amount of data in dozens of data fields.  As a means to easily collect and transmit the 
data pulled from the J001, the data were compiled in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.  Due 
to the amount of data collected, data were pulled from the J001 in manageable batch sizes 
consistent with Excel’s inherent spreadsheet size constraints.  The detailed process 
followed to collect and organize the data is presented in Appendix A.   
Following is a discussion of the data selected from the database for analysis.   
Data Selection 
The director of SAF/SB established the IPT to achieve the fourth goal of the Small 
Business Plan, “enhance the effectiveness of the SB and SBCU/MI program through the 
use of data and analysis.” (Diamond, 2003)  The team was tasked with objectively 
assessing the effectiveness of the SB and HBCU/MI Program and identifying targets of 
opportunities for improvement.  To achieve this goal, Mr. Diamond assembled a group of 
individuals with experience and in positions uniquely suited to lending insight into the 
problems under exploration.  The team consisted of major command and center directors 
of small business, small business specialists, data managers, and Air Force Institute of 
Technology student researchers.  The team identified eight projects.  This study is limited 
to small business participation within certain contract types and product areas.  The 
relevant parameters are as follows: 
Time Frame 
Due mainly to the unavailability (or inaccessibility) of contract award data prior to 
1990, the boundaries of the contract award date will be those complete fiscal years 
between 1990 and 2003. 
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Contract Types 
When posting a contract award, the DD Form 350 allows for the selection of eight 
general contract types, recorded as discrete numerical codes.  The buyer or contracting 
officer selects the appropriate entry based on the general type of resultant contract action 
being awarded.  The possible selections include Letter Contract (1), Definitive Contract 
(3), Order Under and Agreement (4), Order Under Indefinite-Delivery Contract (5), 
Order Under Federal Schedule, (6), Blanket Purchase Agreement Order Under Federal 
Schedule (7), Order from UNICOR or JWOD (8), and Award Under FAR Part 13 (9).  
This study explored contract awards via two contract types, Definitive Contracts and 
Orders Under Indefinite-Delivery Contracts.   
Product Types 
When posting a contract award, the DD Form 350 records the appropriate Federal 
Supply Class or Service Code of the action.  For the purposes of this research, the Air 
Force Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization believed it appropriate to 
explore not just the trends in contracts vehicles used to procure from small businesses, 
but the spending trends in major product areas of goods and services.   
The Data IPT leader selected product/service areas based on those areas reported by 
the Federal Procurement Data Center in the annual Federal Procurement Data Report.  
The report categorizes federal procurement spending into three groups: Research & 
Development, Other Services & Construction, and Supplies & Equipment.  The IPT 
chose to break apart Other Services & Construction into two separate groups, resulting in 
four major groups of interest.  Within these groups, the Federal Procurement Data Report 
further breaks down the product areas into hierarchical levels of categorization.  The IPT 
   
 3-4   
chose to analyze cumulative data for the Construction and Services and Leases categories 
and limited subcategories of the Supplies & Equipment and Services & Leases 
categories.  By preserving continuity among Government reports in this way, the IPT’s 
report will be additive and can be compared in parallel with other government reports.  
Table 3-1 details the inclusive product categories. 
Table 3-1: Product Categories 
Product 
Category 
Code Product Category Name 
Inclusive Federal Stock 
Class Codes 
 1 Supplies & Equipment 10 through 99 
 1A  Automated Data Processing Equipment 70 
 1B  Systems 1510, 1520, 1540, & 1550 
 1C  Aircraft Components 1560 & 16 
 1D  Communication & Radar Equipment 58 
 1E  Engines & Components 28 
 1 Other  Other Supplies & Equipment All Remaining Categories 
 2 Services & Leases B through X 
 2A  Professional Services R 
 2B  Utilities S111, S112, S113, S114, & 
S119 
 2C  Base Operating Support Services S201 through S299 
 2D  Repair of Equipment J 
 2E  Government Owned Contractor 
Operated Parts Stores 
M 
 2F  Modification of Equipment K 
 2 Other  Other Services & Leases All Remaining Categories 
 3 Construction Y & Z 
 4 Research & Development A 
 
Method of Analysis 
The research and investigative questions deal with both trend analysis and causal 
relationships.  Specifically, they ask if acquisition reform initiatives effected small 
business and contract type utilization and they ask to what extent the Air Force has used 
certain contract types.  Three methods lend themselves to answering these types of 
questions: Descriptive Numerical Comparison, Standard Multiple Regression, and Time-
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Series Analysis.  This section outlines these three methods and the methods selected for 
this study. 
Standard Multiple Regression 
Regression analysis is a method for analyzing and evaluating the relationship between 
one or more independent variables to a single dependent variable.  Multiple regression is 
the term used when more than one independent variable is introduced into the model. 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001)   
The appropriateness of regression analysis can be characterized by the following 
possible applications (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, and Nizam, 1998): 
- Characterize the relationship between the dependent and independent variables by 
determining the extent, direction, and strength of the association. 
- Define a quantitative formula or equation to describe the dependent variable as a 
function of the independent variables. 
- Describe the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable while controlling for the effects of other variables. 
- Determine which of several independent variables are important and which are 
not for describing or predicting a dependent variable. 
- Determine the best mathematical model for describing the relationship between a 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. 
- Assess the interactive effects of two or more independent variables with regard to 
a dependent variable. 
- Obtain a valid and precise estimate of one or more regression coefficients from a 
larger set of regression coefficients in a given model. 
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The result of regression is an equation that represents the best prediction of the 
dependent variable from one or more independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001).  The equation is as follows: y  = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + · · · + βkxk + ∈.  The response 
variable, y, represents the predicted value of the dependent variable.  The y-intercept, β0, 
represents the value of y given all null estimators (all values of x equal zero), given a total 
of k estimators.   The predictor variables, x, represent the independent variables assigned 
to the model.  The error component of the model is represented by∈.   
Time-Series Analysis   
Time series analysis is a method for analyzing repeated observations over time.  Time 
series analysis has three main goals: identify patters in the sequence of numbers of time, 
which are correlated with themselves, but offset in time; test the impact of one or more 
interventions; and forecast future patters of events or to compare series of different kinds 
of events.  (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) 
The appropriateness of time-series analysis can be characterized by the following 
possible applications (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001): 
- Determine patterns of autocorrelation. 
- Determine seasonal cycles and trends. 
- Forecast future values of observations. 
- Determine the effect of interventions. 
- Compare patterns over time for different variables or populations. 
- Assess the relevance of predictors (covariates). 
- Determine the strength of the model’s association and power. 
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There are two prominent types of time-series analysis: time domain and spectral 
domain.  Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) best describe the two methods as follows: 
Time domain analyses deal directly with the [dependent variable] over time; 
spectral domain analyses decompose a time series into its sine wave components.  
Either time or spectral domain analyses can be used for identification, estimation, and 
diagnosis of a time series.  However, current statistical software offers no assistance 
for intervention analysis using spectral methods. 
 
One of the most popular time-series models is called the ARIMA (p, d, q) model.  
The ARIMA acronym stands for auto-regressive, integrated, moving average.  It 
incorporates three primary elements: p, the auto-regressive element that controls for 
lingering effects of preceding scores; d, the integrated element that represents trends in 
the data; and q, the moving average element.  (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001)   
Descriptive Numerical Comparison 
Descriptive quantitative research involves either identifying the characteristics of an 
observed phenomenon or exploring possible correlations among two or more phenomena 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  While the previously discussed techniques, Standard 
Multiple Regression and Time Series Analysis, explore correlations, Descriptive 
Numerical Comparison seeks to define observed traits in the data.  By observing these 
traits, value can be derived from their comparison. 
Selected Methods 
The research and investigative questions beg for two methods of analyses: a method 
of causal/correlation analysis and a method of descriptive comparison.  Possibly the most 
effective method available to test the contribution of multiple (independent) variables to 
that of a single (dependent) variable is multiple regression (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).  
The choice of this type of analysis was most appropriate for this study in particular, as 
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there were only 13 time-series data points available.  Tabachnick and Fidell adamantly 
point that time-series analysis can only be used when observations are made repeatedly 
over 50 or more time periods (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  Clearly, the most effective 
model available to answer the causal research questions is standard multiple regression.  
For the investigative questions that ask the question of what happened, Descriptive 
Numerical Comparison will provide for the most effective identification of data 
characteristics. 
Standard Multiple Regression Analysis 
This section describes the construction of the regression model, including dependent 
variables, independent variables, the multiple regression model, hypotheses related to the 
regression model, and regression analysis techniques. 
Dependent Variables 
The response variables of the model, y(1 through 39), are the dependent variables to be 
modeled.  By fitting the models to a set of data, responses for each model can be used to 
answer the research and investigative questions (McClave, Benson, and Sincich, 2001). A 
model was constructed for each of the 39 response variables of interest. 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of procurement vehicles: 
y1 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts 
y2 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on Air 
Force small business utilization overall and within certain contract types: 
y3 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses 
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y4 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type 
contracts 
y5 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type 
contracts 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of C-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Supplies & 
Equipment product category. 
y6 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment product category 
y7 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing product subcategory 
y8 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Systems product subcategory 
y9 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components product subcategory 
y10 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar Equipment product 
subcategory 
y11 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components product subcategory 
y12 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment product subcategory 
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The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of C-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Services & Leases 
product category. 
y13 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases product category 
y14 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Professional Services product subcategory 
y15 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Utilities product subcategory 
y16 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services product subcategory 
y17 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment product subcategory 
y18 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated Supply Stores 
product subcategory 
y19 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment product subcategory 
y20 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases product subcategory 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of C-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Construction product 
category. 
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y21 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Construction product category 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of C-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Research & 
Development product category. 
y22 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via C-type contracts in the 
Research & Development product category 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of D-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Supplies & 
Equipment product category. 
y23 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment product category 
y24 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing product subcategory 
y25 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Systems product subcategory 
y26 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components product subcategory 
y27 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar Equipment product 
subcategory 
y28 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components product subcategory 
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y29 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment product subcategory 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of D-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Services & Leases 
product category. 
y30 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases product category 
y31 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Professional Services product subcategory 
y32 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Utilities product subcategory 
y33 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services product subcategory 
y34 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment product subcategory 
y35 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated Supply Stores 
product subcategory 
y36 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment product subcategory 
y37 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases product subcategory 
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The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of D-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Construction product 
category. 
y38 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Construction product category 
The following variables will test the effect of acquisition reform initiatives on the Air 
Force’s use of D-type contracts to procure goods and services in the Research & 
Development product category. 
y39 = Percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded via D-type contracts in the 
Research & Development product category 
 Independent Variables 
The predictor variables of the model, x(1 through 9), are the independent variables used to 
predict the value of the response variable (McClave, Benson, and Sincich, 2001).  This 
model incorporates both quantitative and qualitative predictor variables.  The quantitative 
variables are numeric in nature and are derived from summary parameters of yearly 
DD350 data.  The qualitative variables are not numerical in nature and, therefore, require 
alternate representation in the model.  By coding the qualitative variables with numeric 
indicators they can be modeled beside the quantitative variables (McClave, Benson, and 
Sincich, 2001).  Data collected for a given period can be known to have been collected 
either during an applicable acquisition reform period or not during an applicable 
acquisition reform period; therefore, within the model, the qualitative variable can be 
“turned on” with a value of 1 or “turned off” with a value of 0. 
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The model will utilize nine predictor variables.  Four variables (x1 through x4) will 
account for the applicability of acquisition reform initiatives.  One variable (x5) will 
account for the total contract dollars.  Four variables (x6 through x9) will account for the 
percentage of dollars awarded via specific contract vehicles (C-type, D-type, MAC, and 
GWAC). 
The Multiple Regression Model 
Although there are 39 response variables of interest and, therefore, 39 separate 
models, each model shares the same predictor variables.  The model, in equation form, is 
as follows: 
y(1 through 39)  = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + β6x6 + β7x7 + β8x8 + β9x9 + ∈ 
where 
y(1 through 39)  = (Identified above) 
x1 = Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (0 if pre-DAWIA, 1 if post-
DAWIA) 
x2 = Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (0 if pre-FASA, 1 if post-FASA) 
x3 = Clinger-Cohen Act (0 if pre-Clinger-Cohen Act, 1 if post-Clinger-Cohen Act) 
x4 = Far Part 15 Re-write (o if pre-FAR 15 Re-write, 1 if post-FAR 15 Re-write) 
x5 = DD350 Contract dollars 
x6 = C-type contract percentage 
x7 = D-type contract percentage 
x8 = Multiple Award Contract percentage 
x9 = Government Wide Agency Contract percentage 
 
   
 3-15   
Hypotheses 
The regression model will allow hypotheses to be tested and, therefore, establish a 
basis for answering the research and investigative questions.  Each hypotheses is tied to a 
response variable (e.g. H1 will be answered by y1, H2 will be answered by y2, etc.) and 
serves to answer the associated research and investigative questions.  The hypotheses are 
as follows: 
H1: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the Air Force’s 
use of C-type contracts. 
H2: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the Air Force’s 
use of D-type contracts. 
H3: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses. 
H4: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H5: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H6: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment contract dollars awarded to small business 
via C-type contracts. 
H7: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
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H8: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Systems contract dollars awarded to small 
business via C-type contracts. 
H9: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components contract dollars 
awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H10: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H11: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components contract dollars 
awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H12: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H13: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases contract dollars awarded to small business via 
C-type contracts. 
H14: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Professional Services contract dollars awarded 
to small business via C-type contracts. 
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H15: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars awarded to small 
business via C-type contracts. 
H16: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H17: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment contract dollars awarded 
to small business via C-type contracts. 
H18: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated Parts 
Stores contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H19: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment contract dollars 
awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H20: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases contract dollars 
awarded to small business via C-type contracts. 
H21: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type 
contracts. 
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H22: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Research & Development contract dollars awarded to small 
business via C-type contracts. 
H23: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment contract dollars awarded to small business 
via D-type contracts. 
H24: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H25: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Systems contract dollars awarded to small 
business via D-type contracts. 
H26: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components contract dollars 
awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H27: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H28: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components contract dollars 
awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
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H29: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H30: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases contract dollars awarded to small business via 
D-type contracts. 
H31: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Professional Services contract dollars awarded 
to small business via D-type contracts. 
H32: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars awarded to small 
business via D-type contracts. 
H33: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H34: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment contract dollars awarded 
to small business via D-type contracts. 
H35: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated Parts 
Stores contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
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H36: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment contract dollars 
awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H37: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases contract dollars 
awarded to small business via D-type contracts. 
H38: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type 
contracts. 
H39: Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) the percentage 
of Air Force Research & Development contract dollars awarded to small 
business via D-type contracts. 
Regression Analysis Techniques 
Standard Multiple Regression will allow for the systematic test of each hypothesis as 
quantified with its related regression model.  Each of the 39 models will be analyzed 
using the statistical analysis software JMP Version 5.0.1.  The units for analysis include: 
the Multiple Correlation Coefficient (R2), the Adjusted Multiple Correlation Coefficient 
(R2adj), the p-value of the F-statistic, and the Parameter Characteristics (estimates of β and 
their p-values). 
The Multiple Correlation Coefficient (R2).  R2 is a measure of explained variance.  Its 
value represents the proportion of variation in the model that is explained by the model.  
For example, when a model has an R2 of 0.9, that model explains 90% of the variance in 
the response variable (y) with the included regressors (x1 thru n).  The downside of the R2 
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measurement, however, is that as additional regressors are added to the model, R2 always 
increases.  In other words, one can drive R2 to 1.0 (a perfect fit) simply by adding more 
regressors.  (Lattin, Carroll, and Green, 2003) 
The Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  Like R2, R2adj is a measure of explained 
variance.  Due to its calculation accounting for the degrees of freedom of the model, 
however, R2adj does not increase with the inclusion of more regressors.  In fact, R2adj will 
decrease with the inclusion of each regressor at a rate comparable to each regressor’s p-
value (e.g. The higher the p-value of the regressor, the more it’s effect lowers the model’s 
R2adj.) The comparison of a model’s R2 to its R2adj will show how well the model explains 
the variation in the response variable and whether the model’s R2 has been driven 
unreasonably high.  (Lattin, Carroll, and Green, 2003) 
The p-value of the F-statistic.  The F-statistic tests the statistical significance of the 
overall model.  The p-value of the F-statistic represents the probability of at least one of 
the β coefficients equaling zero.  An F-statistic p-value of 0.05 or less (α = 0.05) would 
indicate that at least one of the β coefficients is not zero and, therefore, implies a 
successful model.  (Lattin, Carroll, and Green, 2003) 
Parameter Characteristics.  The characteristics of the model’s parameters (regressors) 
include the estimates of the regressors (their β-values) and their p-values.  The value of a 
regressor’s β is the value by which that regressor is multiplied in the model (e.g. β1x1).  A 
β-value of 5.0 would indicate that for every 1.0 increase of the regressor, the response 
variable (y)would increase by 5.0.  Calculated with each β-value is a p-value.  The p-
value of a given β represents the probability that the given β is zero.  A p-value of 0.05 or 
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less (α = 0.05) indicates that the given β is statistically significant because there is only a 
5% (or less) chance of the given β equaling zero. 
Descriptive Numerical Comparison 
Two of the investigative questions (1a and 1b) represent an effort to identify the value 
of the extent to which the Air Force has procured goods and services via selected contract 
types in selected product categories from small businesses.  This effort is solely an 
attempt to quantify small business contract awards during the research period (1990 thru 
2003), not to assert any effects of legislation or other factors.  Hence, these investigative 
questions will be answered with a simple descriptive comparison of the numerical data.   
Several points of comparison will be made.  Chief among these will be the trend of 
small business utilization, computed as the slope of the least squares regression line 
through the yearly small business utilization rates. Differences in small business 
utilization in the selected contract types and product categories will be computed and 
compared with each other and the overall small business utilization rate. 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the methodology used in this study.  It reviewed the database, 
the selection of data, and the methods used to analyze the data.  The methodology 
detailed in this chapter will be used to address the hypotheses and answer the research 
and investigative questions.   
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IV.  Data Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter details the analysis performed on the data as outlined in Chapter 3.  It 
will present the data included for regression and trend analysis, then discuss the analyses 
in detail.    
Summary of Data 
Regression Data 
Contract award data were compiled for incorporation into the regression models.  
Data for analyses are presented in Table 4-1. 
Year *
x 1        
DAWIA
x 2    
FASA
x 3         
Clinger-  
Cohen
x 4     
FAR 
15
x 5            
Total 
Dollars **
x 6        
%       C-
type
x 7        
%       D-
type
x 8     
% 
MAC
x 9        
% 
GWAC
1990 0 0 0 0 59,630,960 15.82 11.32 0.00 0.00
1991 0 0 0 0 58,945,512 22.03 15.18 0.00 0.00
1992 1 0 0 0 48,243,892 11.54 15.78 0.00 0.00
1993 1 0 0 0 54,555,821 19.27 17.02 0.00 0.00
1994 1 0 0 0 52,113,265 16.00 19.37 0.00 0.00
1995 1 0 0 0 45,679,591 16.08 19.68 0.00 0.00
1996 1 1 0 0 46,023,123 23.87 21.42 5.36 0.00
1997 1 1 1 0 40,240,647 65.34 21.43 4.82 0.00
1998 1 1 1 0 38,378,342 63.02 22.45 6.15 0.00
1999 1 1 1 0 40,144,284 65.42 23.46 7.55 0.00
2000 1 1 1 0 41,746,694 58.19 23.54 5.85 0.00
2001 1 1 1 0 42,033,536 55.98 26.05 6.98 0.00
2002 1 1 1 1 48,121,971 52.77 27.35 7.75 0.65
2003 1 1 1 1 40,456,561 57.07 29.82 13.76 0.61
** Presented in thousands of fiscal year 2003 dollars (FY03$000).
Table 4-1: Summary Data for Regression Analysis
* Fiscal year of summary data included only for reference, not as available in the 
regression models.
 
The data for the regression analysis were normalized and adjusted in three ways.  
First, applicability of the acquisition reform initiatives were represented with a binary 
selection.  If the initiative did not apply in a given year, the initiative was represented 
with a zero (0) in the model.  If the initiative applied in a given year, the initiative was 
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represented with a one (1).  Second, the total contract dollars for the given years were 
inflated so as to represent constant fiscal year 2003 dollars.  Third, the percentage-of-
dollars variables (x6 through x9) were computed by dividing the total type (C-type, D-
type, MAC, and GWAC) dollars in a given year by that year’s total contract dollars. 
Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types Trend Data 
Contract award small business percentage data for the selected contract types (C-type 
and D-type) were compiled for analysis.  Data for analysis is presented in Table 4-2. 
Contract 
Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All 7.5 8.0 8.7 10.1 10.1 11.5 11.1 11.6 11.7 10.7 11.5 10.6 10.8 8.2
C-Type 18.0 12.1 30.2 19.6 21.4 25.0 14.6 10.4 10.7 9.0 10.0 10.3 10.0 6.6
D-Type 22.0 19.6 20.5 22.4 19.9 23.1 20.6 19.1 19.1 17.0 16.5 15.1 16.3 12.0
Table 4-2: SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types
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Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types by Product Categories Trend Data 
Contract award small business percentage data for the selected contract types (C-
type and D-type) in the selected product categories were compiled for analysis.  Data for 
analysis is presented in Tables 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5. 
Contract 
Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cat. 1
All 4.7 4.9 5.6 6.1 5.8 7.1 5.3 6.5 6.6 6.1 6.3 4.9 5.7 5.1
C-Type 13.6 7.7 27.6 10.6 10.1 18.1 4.6 4.4 3.8 4.0 3.4 3.8 4.0 3.4
D-Type 13.9 16.4 22.8 26.5 14.2 23.5 13.7 15.6 15.6 11.9 12.1 8.7 10.7 8.8
Cat. 1A
All 11.5 27.4 30.8 26.8 25.1 28.9 16.9 9.8 12.4 10.9 20.3 7.8 10.4 6.6
C-Type 46.8 26.7 44.2 42.1 40.5 46.5 46.5 9.4 3.5 3.5 1.4 4.2 11.5 7.7
D-Type 6.5 38.3 42.3 32.8 30.0 44.7 17.4 9.9 20.5 17.9 15.2 15.8 16.6 9.4
Cat. 1B
All 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.9
C-Type 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.7
D-Type 22.2 17.7 16.1 8.8 100.0 0.0 0.2 6.0 1.7 1.8 3.9 1.9 0.5 1.6
Cat. 1C
All 9.1 14.7 8.9 12.7 15.9 8.6 10.2 12.5 12.4 7.9 8.7 8.3 13.0 11.1
C-Type 33.0 38.8 19.5 41.0 21.9 28.1 18.4 9.9 15.5 8.1 11.5 15.0 12.2 15.7
D-Type 21.8 20.4 20.2 30.2 37.0 11.4 11.7 31.9 20.4 17.5 10.4 3.5 13.2 7.2
Cat. 1D
All 2.0 5.6 6.7 4.9 5.8 4.8 5.4 3.9 3.1 4.8 6.2 4.9 6.5 4.7
C-Type 5.4 5.5 16.9 4.2 7.3 8.3 10.7 3.0 2.5 4.7 2.9 3.7 7.7 1.4
D-Type 8.3 5.8 14.4 20.3 26.8 18.8 8.0 6.9 2.7 3.8 8.3 6.9 6.4 6.7
Cat. 1E
All 3.3 2.5 4.4 5.0 2.8 7.4 4.5 9.0 5.3 3.3 3.7 3.0 4.3 2.9
C-Type 44.9 31.2 40.6 10.6 51.1 14.9 44.3 13.7 4.6 9.1 4.3 9.8 10.2 4.7
D-Type 10.0 5.5 8.8 9.4 1.5 8.9 4.2 8.2 6.8 2.0 3.7 1.6 2.9 2.2
Cat. 1 Other
All 9.5 7.2 12.1 12.6 16.4 13.7 12.9 15.9 15.1 15.8 18.8 14.1 12.3 14.8
C-Type 25.1 10.8 32.9 15.6 16.2 20.5 13.3 11.1 9.2 11.1 10.5 9.0 7.5 10.7
D-Type 19.6 19.7 24.5 33.3 25.1 28.5 35.3 31.0 32.9 24.6 27.6 29.0 29.2 21.8
Table 4-3: SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Catagory 1
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Contract 
Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cat. 2
All 13.4 12.6 12.8 13.9 13.6 12.9 14.1 13.2 13.0 13.3 14.7 14.1 14.6 18.2
C-Type 12.4 13.4 19.3 13.9 14.4 17.2 19.4 11.3 11.2 11.5 12.7 15.5 17.4 7.3
D-Type 22.8 17.6 16.5 16.8 18.4 17.3 18.3 16.3 15.7 16.5 15.1 15.3 15.0 14.6
Cat. 2A
All 13.4 14.0 14.0 17.1 15.2 15.7 17.3 20.8 20.9 18.6 19.2 16.8 15.8 15.4
C-Type 14.5 15.3 4.8 29.2 13.7 30.8 34.9 15.9 16.7 15.5 17.2 21.2 22.7 22.2
D-Type 41.4 32.9 29.4 27.6 26.6 28.1 29.0 28.6 28.2 28.1 18.1 18.0 16.6 16.7
Cat. 2B
All 5.0 4.0 4.9 3.4 6.2 6.0 4.0 3.2 4.5 4.5 5.2 3.6 5.9 15.3
C-Type 26.8 51.1 12.2 3.0 18.4 31.8 18.1 7.0 8.4 3.3 23.0 7.6 2.4 8.6
D-Type 7.7 5.1 3.4 3.5 4.4 3.6 3.9 2.9 4.2 4.7 4.2 3.6 7.7 24.0
Cat. 2C
All 62.5 37.3 45.0 61.7 55.8 49.1 52.6 46.2 45.3 44.5 50.2 45.1 37.6 33.7
C-Type 62.5 49.1 51.8 49.1 40.7 51.1 57.2 46.9 53.3 51.1 51.4 44.6 46.3 43.0
D-Type 82.0 77.8 71.3 69.8 69.4 70.5 69.3 56.5 37.2 39.2 58.8 55.2 33.2 25.0
Cat. 2D
All 5.9 7.0 5.5 6.8 6.4 6.3 11.0 6.9 5.8 5.9 8.3 11.8 10.7 7.2
C-Type 3.6 14.9 14.6 4.7 22.1 18.7 20.9 4.7 2.8 3.1 5.2 10.2 11.0 10.6
D-Type 8.3 9.1 7.0 10.0 11.8 12.6 19.8 12.2 10.6 9.8 10.8 12.4 10.1 6.1
Cat. 2E
All 3.8 4.6 4.1 6.0 7.8 9.3 9.2 8.5 12.5 13.8 14.9 17.9 17.2 14.8
C-Type 1.7 69.2 59.2 20.5 19.4 8.7 21.9 8.1 11.5 13.8 14.6 17.4 17.3 15.7
D-Type 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.2 2.0 4.2 4.6 12.3 14.4 18.7 23.0 18.3 28.5
Cat. 2F
All 4.4 2.8 8.4 6.1 5.3 2.7 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.8 4.3 2.1 9.4 3.3
C-Type 3.7 0.7 7.3 0.7 1.4 17.0 0.3 0.3 1.8 0.3 4.3 1.8 12.7 3.0
D-Type 0.4 0.8 6.3 12.8 3.2 1.7 0.4 3.1 1.6 3.2 5.1 1.8 6.1 3.8
Cat. 2 Other
All 24.1 18.5 20.7 19.4 18.0 15.2 15.0 14.0 12.5 12.1 13.5 11.2 11.8 8.2
C-Type 14.8 11.7 50.7 11.7 8.3 7.7 7.0 11.4 9.8 7.6 7.0 9.0 8.9 2.5
D-Type 32.3 20.4 21.8 24.4 23.7 19.8 17.2 15.9 15.6 16.5 17.5 16.1 14.4 22.2
Table 4-4: SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Catagory 2
 
Contract 
Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cat. 3
All 60.4 59.9 61.8 64.4 62.1 60.4 59.2 54.0 60.0 51.9 56.1 66.2 67.7 49.4
C-Type 67.2 65.1 50.9 70.5 71.6 33.9 64.5 57.6 63.2 53.0 62.5 73.2 74.0 52.9
D-Type 89.8 80.4 59.1 60.4 56.5 58.0 57.2 48.2 53.8 49.4 46.9 59.9 63.9 46.3
Cat. 4
All 4.4 5.0 5.4 6.0 6.1 7.0 8.3 8.6 8.5 8.3 9.5 9.1 8.6 12.6
C-Type 17.7 6.8 13.7 23.1 28.7 30.6 20.4 9.5 10.2 8.0 10.2 10.1 10.1 13.5
D-Type 27.7 19.9 25.0 25.1 25.0 19.3 23.9 20.6 23.6 14.8 16.4 8.4 11.2 8.3
Table 4-5: SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Catagories 3 & 4
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Results of Regression Analysis 
This section details the results of the analyses of the 39 regression models.  Presented 
for each model are analyses of the model’s Multiple Correlation Coefficient (R2), 
Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj), p-value of its F-statistic, and Parameter 
Characteristics; then, the results of the regression analyses will be used to test the 
hypotheses. 
Regression Model y1 
The results of the analysis of model y1 are presented in Table 4-6. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 1
R 2adj 1
ε 0
null No
Parameter Estimate p -value
β 0 −0.0000040 null No
β 1 0.0000020 null No
β 2 0.0000038 null No
β 3 −0.0000008 null No
β 4 0.0000987 null No
β 5 0.0000000 null No
β 6 1.0000001 null No
β 7 −0.0000001 null No
β 8 −0.0000008 null No
β 9 −0.0001520 null No
y 1: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts
Table 4-6: Regression Analysis of Model y 1
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
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Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 1.  When viewed alone, this would seem to 
indicate that the model explains 100% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 1.  When viewed alone, this, too, would seem 
to indicate that the model explains 100% of the variance in the data.  This result, 
however, is contrary to the definition of R2adj.  With nine included regressors in the 
model, R2adj should at least be slightly lower than R2.  Further analysis of the model is 
obviously required. 
Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a null p-value of the F-statistic.  As revealed in the analysis of the 
parameter characteristics, this result occurred due to linear dependencies in the design of 
the model. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in exceptionally low parameter estimates and null p-values of the 
parameter estimates.  Online JMP documentation revealed that this occurs when there are 
exact linear dependencies in the design of the model (FAQ # 1231, 2004).  Tabachnick 
and Fidell describe this problem as one of either multicollinearity or singularity 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  Multicollinearity occurs when the variables are very 
highly correlated and singularity occurs when the variables are redundant (a combination 
of two or more other variables).  As the variables in this model are not combinations of 
other variables in this model, the result of the analysis of the p-values of this model 
would indicate a problem of multicollinearity. 
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Overall Model Analysis.  This model fails to provide any causal insight into the 
relationship of the regressors to the response variable.  As indicated above, this model has 
issues of variable multicollinearity.  Although it may be possible to remove certain 
“offending” variables from the model and, thereby, improve the accuracy (or 
successfulness) of the model, such is not the focus of this thesis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). 
Regression Model y2 
The results of the analysis of model y2 are presented in Table 4-7. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 1
R 2adj 1
ε 0
<.0001 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −0.0000100 0.1269 No
β 1 −0.0000001 0.8960 No
β 2 0.0000034 0.1435 No
β 3 −0.0000003 0.8857 No
β 4 0.0000517 0.1974 No
β 5 0.0000000 0.2113 No
β 6 0.0000000 0.6090 No
β 7 1.0000002 <.0001 Yes
β 8 −0.0000006 0.1517 No
β 9 −0.0000810 0.1957 No
Table 4-7: Regression Analysis of Model y 2
y 2: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
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Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 1.  When viewed alone, this would seem to 
indicate that the model explains 100% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 1.  When viewed alone, this, too, would seem 
to indicate that the model explains 100% of the variance in the data.  This result, 
however, is contrary to the definition of R2adj.  With nine included regressors in the 
model, R2adj should at least be slightly lower than R2.  Further analysis of the model is 
obviously required. 
Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of <.0001.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in only one statistically significant parameter estimate: β7.  The model 
estimates that for every 1% increase in the proportion of dollars awarded via D-type 
contracts, the proportion of dollars awarded via D-type contracts increased 1.0000002%.  
This is a somewhat obvious correlation.  It is more interesting to note that the effect of 
the other variables is not statistically significant. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model has only one of nine statistically significant 
regressors and a dubiously-high R2 and R2adj.  It appears to show that, within the confines 
of the model, only the proportion of D-type contract spending itself has a statistically 
significant impact on the proportion of D-type contract spending.   
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Regression Model y3 
The results of the analysis of model y3 are presented in Table 4-8. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.92943
R 2adj 0.770648
ε 0.48676
0.0521 No
Parameter Estimate p -value
β 0 8.3926329 0.2335 No
β 1 0.7401476 0.5844 No
β 2 2.3296368 0.3431 No
β 3 −3.5428800 0.2521 No
β 4 −9.3351130 0.8232 No
β 5 −0.0000001 0.3980 No
β 6 0.0856425 0.2487 No
β 7 0.2261749 0.1839 No
β 8 −0.5862010 0.1871 No
β 9 15.8631160 0.8070 No
Table 4-8: Regression Analysis of Model y 3
y 3: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded to small businesses
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.92943.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 93% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.77065, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 77% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0521.  Being greater than 0.05, the 
p-value of the F-statistic indicates that the β coefficients may not be greater zero and, 
therefore, implies an unsuccessful model. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant parameter estimates.  This result was 
expected considering p-value of the F-statistic of this model. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and response variable.   
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Regression Model y4 
The results of the analysis of model y4 are presented in Table 4-9. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.994766
R 2adj 0.9830
ε 0.8242
0.0003 Yes
Parameter Estimate p -value
β 0 77.5852490 0.0006 Yes
β 1 5.4616739 0.0281 Yes
β 2 −6.7641530 0.0746 No
β 3 13.0597300 0.0193 Yes
β 4 −95.9288300 0.1328 No
β 5 −0.0000006 0.0050 Yes
β 6 −0.5264240 0.0031 Yes
β 7 −0.9231430 0.0073 Yes
β 8 0.3691194 0.4846 No
β 9 153.7478900 0.1239 No
Table 4-9: Regression Analysis of Model y 4
y 4: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.994766.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.9830, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0003.  This is well below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in five statistically significant regressors (β1, β 3, β 5, β 6, and β 7).  
The model estimates that: 
- The DAWIA influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via C-type contracts by 5%, 
- The Clinger-Cohen Act influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via C-type contracts by 13% 
- The total amount of Air Force DD-350 contract dollars spent influenced the 
percentage of contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts by 
-0.0000007% for every $1,000 spent (or -0.7% for every $1Billion). 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via C-type contracts influenced the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts by -0.5%. 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via D-type contracts influences the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts by -0.9%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
several of the regressors and response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y5 
The results of the analysis of model y5 are presented in Table 4-10. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.933423
R 2adj 0.7836
ε 2.0906
0.0468 Yes
Parameter Estimate p -value
β 0 35.4398490 0.0461 Yes
β 1 0.9742918 0.7251 No
β 2 0.6508293 0.8918 No
β 3 −9.5328280 0.1575 No
β 4 −42.3407800 0.6293 No
β 5 −0.0000002 0.3281 No
β 6 0.1647833 0.2787 No
β 7 −0.3726750 0.2711 No
β 8 −0.4558950 0.5829 No
β 9 71.8284210 0.5991 No
Table 4-10: Regression Analysis of Model y 5
y 5: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.933423.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 93% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.7836, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 78% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0468.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant parameter estimates, other than the y-
intercept. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y6 
The results of the analysis of model y6 are presented in Table 4-11. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.992734
R 2adj 0.9764
ε 10.219
0.0006 Yes
Parameter Estimate p -value
β 0 −46.1778700 0.1675 No
β 1 2.6310576 0.6688 No
β 2 16.6028370 0.1700 No
β 3 −26.3890800 0.0954 No
β 4 213.5937300 0.2995 No
β 5 0.0000007 0.1811 No
β 6 1.5468076 0.0060 Yes
β 7 0.1666474 0.8091 No
β 8 −1.9469380 0.3134 No
β 9 −321.2038000 0.3131 No
Table 4-11: Regression Analysis of Model y 6
y 6: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment product category (Category 1)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0..992734.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.9764, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
   
 4-16   
Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0006.  This is well below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β 6.  The model estimates that 
for every 1% of contract dollars spent via C-type contracts influenced the percentage of 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts in Product Category 1 
by 1.5%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y7 
The results of the analysis of model y7 are presented in Table 4-12. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.98633
R 2adj 0.9556
ε 1.6281
0.0022 Yes
Parameter Estimate p -value
β 0 18.0162310 0.1752 No
β 1 3.1293786 0.2416 No
β 2 −9.7114280 0.0705 No
β 3 −6.3007620 0.2633 No
β 4 40.3157780 0.6034 No
β 5 −0.0000001 0.5784 No
β 6 0.6735077 0.0044 Yes
β 7 −0.8150390 0.0341 Yes
β 8 −0.2869590 0.6924 No
β 9 −59.1556000 0.6229 No
Table 4-12: Regression Analysis of Model y 7
y 7: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Automated Data Processing product 
sub-category (Category 1A)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.98633.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.9556, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 96% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0022.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in two statistically significant regressors (β 6 and β 7).  The model 
estimates that: 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via C-type contracts influenced the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded in the specific product category via C-type contracts 
by 0.7%. 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via D-type contracts influenced the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded in the specific product category via C-type contracts 
by -0.8%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
two of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y8 
The results of the analysis of model y8 are presented in Table 4-13. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.984119
R 2adj 0.9484
ε 52.9
0.0030 Yes
Parameter Estimate p -value
β 0 −22.2806500 0.7391 No
β 1 −6.9739670 0.6198 No
β 2 16.3523420 0.5094 No
β 3 −43.0278500 0.1942 No
β 4 −165.1767000 0.7063 No
β 5 −0.0000006 0.5935 No
β 6 1.9330743 0.0432 Yes
β 7 −1.1016960 0.4951 No
β 8 3.0375868 0.4736 No
β 9 260.5161500 0.7021 No
Table 4-13: Regression Analysis of Model y 8
y 8: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Systems product sub-category 
(Category 1B)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.984119.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.9484, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 95% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0030.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β 6.  The model estimates that 
for every 1% of contract dollars spent via C-type contracts influenced the percentage of 
contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via C-type contracts by 
1.9%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y9 
The results of the analysis of model y9 are presented in Table 4-14. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.824937
R 2adj 0.431046
ε 156.291
0.2480 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 117.0269800 0.3366 No
β 1 14.6387680 0.5478 No
β 2 29.5220600 0.4897 No
β 3 7.9978838 0.8744 No
β 4 447.2191800 0.5584 No
β 5 −0.0000010 0.5805 No
β 6 0.6304869 0.6090 No
β 7 −3.3819510 0.2516 No
β 8 −5.3730960 0.4618 No
β 9 −671.6208000 0.5709 No
Table 4-14: Regression Analysis of Model y 9
y 9: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Aircraft Components product sub-
category (Category 1C)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.824937.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 82% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.431046, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 43% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.2480.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates that this is an unsuccessful model. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
Regression Model y10 
The results of the analysis of model y10 are presented in Table 4-15. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.956539
R 2adj 0.858752
ε 52.401
0.0211 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −3.6630020 0.9558 No
β 1 6.7344174 0.6299 No
β 2 −0.8638040 0.9712 No
β 3 −30.3456000 0.3315 No
β 4 196.3873000 0.6540 No
β 5 0.0000000 0.9722 No
β 6 1.9513438 0.0415 Yes
β 7 −0.6366360 0.6858 No
β 8 −2.6913650 0.5206 No
β 9 −299.3031000 0.6599 No
Table 4-15: Regression Analysis of Model y 10
y 10: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Communications and Radar Equipment 
product sub-category (Category 1D)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
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Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.956539.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 96% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.858752, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 86% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0211.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β6.  The model estimates that 
for every 1% of contract dollars spent via C-type contracts influenced the percentage of 
contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via C-type contracts by 
2.0%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y11 
The results of the analysis of model y11 are presented in Table 4-16. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.700173
R 2adj 0.025561
ε 108.464
0.5276 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −43.2334000 0.6538 No
β 1 21.6719940 0.3087 No
β 2 −2.9790900 0.9311 No
β 3 −7.8055790 0.8531 No
β 4 402.1617200 0.5291 No
β 5 0.0000007 0.6631 No
β 6 0.8281945 0.4315 No
β 7 −0.5072150 0.8214 No
β 8 −1.8398440 0.7550 No
β 9 −611.1400000 0.5376 No
Table 4-16: Regression Analysis of Model y 11
y 11: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Engines & Components product sub-
category (Category 1E)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.824937.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 82% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.025561, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 3% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.5276.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y12 
The results of the analysis of model y12 are presented in Table 4-17. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.952358
R 2adj 0.845163
ε 46.582
0.0251 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −120.3519000 0.1090 No
β 1 11.2650130 0.4077 No
β 2 0.8289023 0.9707 No
β 3 −13.5966100 0.6275 No
β 4 235.0976900 0.5725 No
β 5 0.0000015 0.1785 No
β 6 1.5323623 0.0692 No
β 7 2.4955558 0.1446 No
β 8 −4.7763210 0.2561 No
β 9 −356.2746000 0.5814 No
Table 4-17: Regression Analysis of Model y 12
y 12: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Engines & Components product sub-
category (Category 1 Other)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.952358.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 95% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.845163, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 85% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0251.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y13 
The results of the analysis of model y13 are presented in Table 4-18. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.995224
R 2adj 0.984479
ε 6.421
0.0003 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 31.1356370 0.2254 No
β 1 5.4181541 0.2973 No
β 2 2.2881266 0.7858 No
β 3 26.6609450 0.0503 No
β 4 130.2716200 0.4113 No
β 5 −0.0000002 0.5735 No
β 6 0.3948707 0.1620 No
β 7 −1.3118320 0.0625 No
β 8 −0.0869590 0.9513 No
β 9 −208.4202000 0.3986 No
Table 4-18: Regression Analysis of Model y 13
y 13: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases product category (Category 2)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.995224.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 100% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.984479, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 98% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0003.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y14 
The results of the analysis of model y14 are presented in Table 4-19. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.990776
R 2adj 0.970021
ε 13.825
0.0010 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 53.9214000 0.1662 No
β 1 7.7903796 0.3058 No
β 2 −0.0834740 0.9946 No
β 3 23.6505510 0.1692 No
β 4 −98.6973800 0.6608 No
β 5 −0.0000006 0.3300 No
β 6 0.5992869 0.1512 No
β 7 −2.0555290 0.0521 No
β 8 −0.2633130 0.8999 No
β 9 151.5963800 0.6642 No
Table 4-19: Regression Analysis of Model y 14
y 14: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Professional Services product sub-category 
(Category 2A)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.990776.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.970021, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 97% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0010.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y15 
The results of the analysis of model y15 are presented in Table 4-20. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.994324
R 2adj 0.981553
ε 2.704
0.0004 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 10.0206270 0.5167 No
β 1 2.5464924 0.4348 No
β 2 −18.5251500 0.0223 Yes
β 3 −9.8270200 0.1906 No
β 4 148.1738100 0.1835 No
β 5 −0.0000001 0.5362 No
β 6 0.4089679 0.0523 No
β 7 −0.6081430 0.1412 No
β 8 3.0868814 0.0238 Yes
β 9 −212.4547000 0.2123 No
Table 4-20: Regression Analysis of Model y 15
y 15: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Utilities product sub-category (Category 
2B)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.994324.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.981553, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0004.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in two statistically significant regressors (β 2 and β 8).  The model 
estimates that: 
- The FASA influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded in the specific 
product category via C-type contracts by -18.5%. 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via MAC contracts influenced the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded in the specific product category via C-type contracts 
by 3.1%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
two of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y16 
The results of the analysis of model y16 are presented in Table 4-21. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.980023
R 2adj 0.935073
ε 33.146
0.0047 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −0.5272030 0.9920 No
β 1 2.5452657 0.8167 No
β 2 18.4142590 0.3615 No
β 3 44.8134360 0.1097 No
β 4 421.5632000 0.2619 No
β 5 0.0000002 0.8071 No
β 6 0.1344716 0.8101 No
β 7 0.1223292 0.9213 No
β 8 −3.6583390 0.2956 No
β 9 −665.6696000 0.2552 No
Table 4-21: Regression Analysis of Model y 16
y 16: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Base Operating Support Services product 
sub-category (Category 2C)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.980023.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.935073, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 94% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0047.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y17 
The results of the analysis of model y17 are presented in Table 4-22. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.987225
R 2adj 0.958480
ε 22.281
0.0020 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 21.7686190 0.6194 No
β 1 17.4576320 0.1071 No
β 2 2.2608353 0.8850 No
β 3 25.6990900 0.2249 No
β 4 −403.9715000 0.2019 No
β 5 0.0000004 0.5545 No
β 6 0.5856422 0.2444 No
β 7 −3.3621650 0.0243 Yes
β 8 2.5585405 0.3631 No
β 9 610.6494000 0.2118 No
Table 4-22: Regression Analysis of Model y 17
y 17: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Repair of Equipment product sub-category 
(Category 2D)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.987225.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.958480, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 96% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0020.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β7.  The model estimates that 
for every 1% of contract dollars spent via D-type contracts influenced the percentage of 
contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via C-type contracts by -
3.4%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y18 
The results of the analysis of model y18 are presented in Table 4-23. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.9997
R 2adj 0.999024
ε 1.93
<.0001 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −3.9701110 0.7560 No
β 1 3.3438182 0.2494 No
β 2 −3.5622640 0.4561 No
β 3 86.3115870 <.0001 Yes
β 4 −280.1496000 0.0229 Yes
β 5 0.0000001 0.5692 No
β 6 0.0920051 0.5075 No
β 7 −0.2228110 0.4722 No
β 8 0.6801134 0.4072 No
β 9 421.2652900 0.0254 Yes
Table 4-23: Regression Analysis of Model y 18
y 18: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated 
Supply Stores product sub-category (Category 2E)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.9997.  When viewed alone, this indicates that 
the model explains 100% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.999024, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 100% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of <0.0001.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in three statistically significant regressors (β3, β4, and β9).  The model 
estimates that: 
- The Clinger-Cohen Act influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded in 
the specific product category via C-type contracts by 86.3%. 
- The FAR Part 15 Re-write influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded 
in the specific product category via C-type contracts by -280.1%. 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via GWAC contracts influenced the 
percentage of contract dollars awarded in the specific product category via C-type 
contracts by 421.3%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
three of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y19 
The results of the analysis of model y19 are presented in Table 4-24. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.911335
R 2adj 0.711839
ε 78.702
0.0788 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 87.9174490 0.3124 No
β 1 −6.1036400 0.7197 No
β 2 29.9197860 0.3388 No
β 3 −0.3449610 0.9923 No
β 4 545.1578200 0.3349 No
β 5 −0.0000008 0.5515 No
β 6 0.9965206 0.2846 No
β 7 −2.7496600 0.1998 No
β 8 −6.0269280 0.2680 No
β 9 −796.2787000 0.3612 No
Table 4-24: Regression Analysis of Model y 19
y 19: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Modification of Equipment product sub-
category (Category 2F)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.911335.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 91% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.711839, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 71% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0788.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
   
 4-42   
Regression Model y20 
The results of the analysis of model y20 are presented in Table 4-24. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.953288
R 2adj 0.848187
ε 49.135
0.0242 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 13.5519960 0.8326 No
β 1 1.6767960 0.8999 No
β 2 −3.3899640 0.8839 No
β 3 34.0057160 0.2705 No
β 4 466.5058300 0.3012 No
β 5 −0.0000001 0.9079 No
β 6 −0.1908550 0.7797 No
β 7 0.5195814 0.7323 No
β 8 0.4096259 0.9173 No
β 9 −748.7491000 0.2875 No
Table 4-25: Regression Analysis of Model y 20
y 20: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Other product sub-category (Category 2 
Other)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.953288.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 95% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.848187, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 85% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0242.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y21 
The results of the analysis of model y21 are presented in Table 4-26. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.925526
R 2adj 0.757959
ε 117.586
0.0575 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 502.6497700 0.0057 No
β 1 −18.6991800 0.3889 No
β 2 −52.9753600 0.1911 No
β 3 10.8614800 0.8050 No
β 4 −686.1623000 0.3225 No
β 5 −0.0000060 0.0114 Yes
β 6 −0.8780990 0.4238 No
β 7 −3.3656930 0.1993 No
β 8 1.6614953 0.7863 No
β 9 1119.4911000 0.3017 No
Table 4-26: Regression Analysis of Model y 21
y 21: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Construction 
product sub-category (Category 3)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.925526.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 93% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.757959, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 76% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0575.  Being greater than 0.05, the 
p-value of the F-statistic indicates that at least one of the β coefficients may not be 
greater zero and, therefore, implies an unsuccessful model. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β5.  The model estimates that 
the total amount of DD-350 contract dollars spent influenced the percentage of contract 
dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts in Product Category 3 by -
0.000006% for every $1,000 spent (or -6% for every $1Billion). 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y22 
The results of the analysis of model y22 are presented in Table 4-27. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.992418
R 2adj 0.975358
ε 29.68
0.0007 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −10.6587900 0.8308 No
β 1 −0.5575290 0.9570 No
β 2 −20.9890200 0.2828 No
β 3 44.7285080 0.0966 No
β 4 −374.8841000 0.2873 No
β 5 0.0000001 0.8700 No
β 6 0.4424603 0.4225 No
β 7 0.2507901 0.8309 No
β 8 4.0350767 0.2337 No
β 9 559.9471500 0.3035 No
Table 4-27: Regression Analysis of Model y 22
y 22: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via C-type contracts in the Research & 
Development product sub-category (Category 4)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.992418.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.975358, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 98% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0007.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y23 
The results of the analysis of model y23 are presented in Table 4-28. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.975291
R 2adj 0.9197
ε 2.1119
0.0071 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −1.1719550 0.9296 No
β 1 −1.2378830 0.6583 No
β 2 −3.7871160 0.4489 No
β 3 1.1724066 0.8421 No
β 4 −64.4724600 0.4733 No
β 5 0.0000000 0.8421 No
β 6 −0.0379020 0.7886 No
β 7 0.9457962 0.0322 Yes
β 8 0.8656631 0.3228 No
β 9 94.1973100 0.4983 No
Table 4-28: Regression Analysis of Model y 23
y 23: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment product category (Category 1)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.975291.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.9197, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 92% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0071.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β7.  The model estimates that 
every 1% of contract dollars spent via D-type contracts influenced the percentage of 
contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via D-type contracts by 
.9%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y24 
The results of the analysis of model y23 are presented in Table 4-29. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.970726
R 2adj 0.9049
ε 12.569
0.0099 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 26.4096620 0.4342 No
β 1 15.2674190 0.0734 No
β 2 5.7490813 0.6294 No
β 3 −38.6686500 0.0453 Yes
β 4 358.1471400 0.1461 No
β 5 0.0000003 0.5254 No
β 6 1.0198801 0.0341 Yes
β 7 −1.2148970 0.1651 No
β 8 −3.2777450 0.1552 No
β 9 −548.3496000 0.1506 No
Table 4-29: Regression Analysis of Model y 24
y 24: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Automated Data Processing product 
sub-category (Category 1A)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.970726.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 97% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.9049, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 90% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of .0099.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in three statistically significant regressors (β3 and β6).  The model 
estimates that: 
- The Clinger-Cohen Act influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded in 
the specific product category via C-type contracts by -38.7%. 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via C-type contracts influenced the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via D-type 
contracts by 1.0%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
two of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y25 
The results of the analysis of model y25 are presented in Table 4-30. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.979655
R 2adj 0.9339
ε 0.43427
0.0049 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −12.5047800 0.0915 No
β 1 1.8113648 0.1986 No
β 2 0.6718885 0.7593 No
β 3 5.3796322 0.0980 No
β 4 9.3918843 0.8120 No
β 5 0.0000003 0.0378 Yes
β 6 −0.6873000 0.3157 No
β 7 −0.1370020 0.3617 No
β 8 0.5017452 0.2231 No
β 9 −12.3511400 0.8402 No
Table 4-30: Regression Analysis of Model y 25
y 25: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Systems product sub-category 
(Category 1B)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.979655.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.9339, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 93% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0049.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β5.  The model estimates that 
the total amount of DD-350 contract dollars spent influenced the percentage of contract 
dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts in Product Sub-Category 1B by 
0.0000003% for every $1,000 spent (or .3% for every $1Billion). 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y26 
The results of the analysis of model y26 are presented in Table 4-31. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.933445
R 2adj 0.783696
ε 20.481
0.0468 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −5.8491620 0.8875 No
β 1 −11.7182100 0.2207 No
β 2 2.3546953 0.8752 No
β 3 16.0144960 0.4041 No
β 4 −45.3300900 0.8670 No
β 5 −0.0000002 0.7628 No
β 6 −0.7831990 0.1300 No
β 7 3.1292611 0.0267 Yes
β 8 0.1255305 0.9607 No
β 9 63.9792620 0.8790 No
Table 4-31: Regression Analysis of Model y 26
y 26: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Aircraft Componentsproduct sub-
category (Category 1C)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.933445.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 93% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.783696, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 78% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0468.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β7.  The model estimates that 
every 1% of contract dollars spent via D-type contracts influenced the percentage of 
contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via D-type contracts by 
3.1%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y27 
The results of the analysis of model y27 are presented in Table 4-32. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.906533
R 2adj 0.696232
ε 50.243
0.0865 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −36.6000400 0.5797 No
β 1 −2.4422010 0.8564 No
β 2 −1.3337270 0.9546 No
β 3 39.0117390 0.2208 No
β 4 −70.7621000 0.8674 No
β 5 0.0000007 0.4774 No
β 6 −0.8974020 0.2365 No
β 7 1.5172302 0.3492 No
β 8 2.5306935 0.5364 No
β 9 97.3374330 0.8824 No
Table 4-32: Regression Analysis of Model y 27
y 27: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Communications and Radar Equipment 
product sub-category (Category 1D)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.906533.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 91% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.696232, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 70% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0865.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y28 
The results of the analysis of model y28 are presented in Table 4-33. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.855954
R 2adj 0.531850
ε 241.691
0.1815 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −63.5838600 0.6584 No
β 1 −13.5153200 0.6519 No
β 2 37.8399580 0.4773 No
β 3 −1.5777950 0.9800 No
β 4 100.3019800 0.9140 No
β 5 −0.0000003 0.8993 No
β 6 −0.4167780 0.7830 No
β 7 7.8025031 0.0679 No
β 8 −6.5147990 0.4722 No
β 9 −190.0413000 0.8952 No
Table 4-33: Regression Analysis of Model y 28
y 28: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Engines & Components product sub-
category (Category 1E)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.855954.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 86% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.531850, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains only 53% of the variance in the data, even 
after being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.1815.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y29 
The results of the analysis of model y29 are presented in Table 4-34. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.905984
R 2adj 0.694449
ε 12.3862
0.0874 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 1.5345007 0.9619 No
β 1 3.3518941 0.6221 No
β 2 −8.7651480 0.4678 No
β 3 9.1582662 0.5308 No
β 4 72.7292620 0.7313 No
β 5 0.0000001 0.8867 No
β 6 −0.1212000 0.7243 No
β 7 0.4887615 0.5297 No
β 8 1.5340569 0.4559 No
β 9 −127.1506000 0.6997 No
Table 4-34: Regression Analysis of Model y 29
y 29: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Supplies & 
Equipment: Engines & Components product sub-
category (Category 1 Other)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.905984.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 91% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.694449, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 69% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0874.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y30 
The results of the analysis of model y30 are presented in Table 4-35. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.688118
R 2adj -0.013620
ε 12.8294
0.5530 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 1.5745056 0.9616 No
β 1 4.3229555 0.5362 No
β 2 1.2794280 0.9140 No
β 3 −11.9413600 0.4295 No
β 4 −6.8830810 0.9743 No
β 5 0.0000004 0.4350 No
β 6 0.3087004 0.3972 No
β 7 0.5944131 0.4576 No
β 8 −0.3755520 0.8524 No
β 9 20.6114160 0.9505 No
Table 4-35: Regression Analysis of Model y 30
y 30: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases product category (Category 2)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.688118.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 69% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of -0.013620, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains none of the variance in the data after being 
adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.5530.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y31 
The results of the analysis of model y31 are presented in Table 4-36. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.916391
R 2adj 0.728272
ε 15.9079
0.0709 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −25.5505500 0.4968 No
β 1 8.6225062 0.2927 No
β 2 7.6510395 0.5705 No
β 3 6.0462013 0.7101 No
β 4 368.3724100 0.1751 No
β 5 0.0000005 0.3718 No
β 6 0.0208463 0.9570 No
β 7 1.3989129 0.1576 No
β 8 −2.1645370 0.3626 No
β 9 −571.6165000 0.1754 No
Table 4-36: Regression Analysis of Model y 31
y 31: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Professional Services product sub-category 
(Category 2A)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.916391.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 92% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.728272, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 73% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0709.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y32 
The results of the analysis of model y32 are presented in Table 4-37. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.994324
R 2adj 0.981553
ε 2.704
0.0004 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 52.6634090 0.1243 No
β 1 30.9443480 0.0054 Yes
β 2 15.4418750 0.1913 No
β 3 −23.8455200 0.1181 No
β 4 −80.2720300 0.6745 No
β 5 0.0000000 0.9127 No
β 6 0.4728955 0.1758 No
β 7 −0.1286020 0.8503 No
β 8 −3.0386220 0.1433 No
β 9 114.1536000 0.7000 No
Table 4-37: Regression Analysis of Model y 32
y 32: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Utilities product sub-category (Category 
2B)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.994324.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.981553, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0004.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in one statistically significant regressor: β1.  The model estimates that 
the DAWIA influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded in the specific product 
category via C-type contracts by 30.9%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
one of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y33 
The results of the analysis of model y33 are presented in Table 4-38. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.980023
R 2adj 0.935073
ε 33.146
0.0047 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 16.2115760 0.5961 No
β 1 8.0824502 0.2405 No
β 2 −10.1483200 0.3766 No
β 3 −0.6413120 0.9615 No
β 4 −301.6341000 0.1772 No
β 5 0.0000003 0.5107 No
β 6 −0.0604060 0.8498 No
β 7 −0.8499190 0.2697 No
β 8 3.8121162 0.0932 No
β 9 481.5546300 0.1679 No
Table 4-38: Regression Analysis of Model y 33
y 33: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Base Operating Support Services product 
sub-category (Category 2C)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.980023.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.935073, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 94% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.00479.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y34 
The results of the analysis of model y34 are presented in Table 4-39. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.938847
R 2adj 0.801253
ε 36.773
0.0400 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 46.1642080 0.4251 No
β 1 −8.3413380 0.4841 No
β 2 −7.9776660 0.6938 No
β 3 52.5111440 0.0847 No
β 4 230.5036300 0.5353 No
β 5 0.0000005 0.5864 No
β 6 −1.2079140 0.0938 No
β 7 −0.3850240 0.7690 No
β 8 2.7828530 0.4342 No
β 9 −350.3463000 0.5436 No
Table 4-39: Regression Analysis of Model y 34
y 34: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Repair of Equipment product sub-category 
(Category 2D)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.938847.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 94% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.801253, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 80% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0400.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y35 
The results of the analysis of model y35 are presented in Table 4-40. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.949191
R 2adj 0.834870
ε 30.706
0.0283 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −23.6018200 0.6456 No
β 1 10.2517670 0.3587 No
β 2 −18.5587700 0.3418 No
β 3 15.4651310 0.5031 No
β 4 87.3052610 0.7928 No
β 5 0.0000014 0.1367 No
β 6 −0.1868370 0.7298 No
β 7 −1.2426850 0.3293 No
β 8 1.3362810 0.6719 No
β 9 −138.2997000 0.7888 No
Table 4-40: Regression Analysis of Model y 35
y 35: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated 
Supply Stores product sub-category (Category 2E)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.949191.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 95% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.834870, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 83% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0400.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y36 
The results of the analysis of model y36 are presented in Table 4-41. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.972238
R 2adj 0.909774
ε 24.34
0.0089 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −29.2457000 0.5276 No
β 1 1.9393261 0.8366 No
β 2 0.8267959 0.9596 No
β 3 −16.6253100 0.4249 No
β 4 99.1482610 0.7383 No
β 5 0.0000002 0.7750 No
β 6 0.4534669 0.3696 No
β 7 1.6170294 0.1801 No
β 8 2.5470061 0.3840 No
β 9 −191.0204000 0.6798 No
Table 4-41: Regression Analysis of Model y 36
y 36: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Modification of Equipment product sub-
category (Category 2F)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.972236.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 97% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.909774, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 91% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0089.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
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Regression Model y37 
The results of the analysis of model y37 are presented in Table 4-42. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.858968
R 2adj 0.541646
ε 65.352
0.1753 No
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 64.3025220 0.4063 No
β 1 −4.1746000 0.7868 No
β 2 6.3937253 0.8117 No
β 3 −54.8476000 0.1485 No
β 4 −273.0072000 0.5797 No
β 5 0.0000003 0.7967 No
β 6 1.0983641 0.2097 No
β 7 −0.2418520 0.8895 No
β 8 −2.6413910 0.5699 No
β 9 464.4568400 0.5457 No
Table 4-42: Regression Analysis of Model y 37
y 37: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Services & 
Leases: Other product sub-category (Category 2 
Other)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.858968.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 86% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.541646, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 54% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.1753.  This is above the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05 and indicates a possibility that all of the model’s coefficients 
are equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.   
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Regression Model y38 
The results of the analysis of model y38 are presented in Table 4-43. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.99586
R 2adj 0.986545
ε 1.704
0.0002 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −6.2050010 0.6090 No
β 1 −0.5498560 0.8251 No
β 2 5.8221459 0.2245 No
β 3 23.5810920 0.0089 Yes
β 4 −8.1220230 0.9170 No
β 5 0.0000001 0.6471 No
β 6 −0.6866530 0.0044 Yes
β 7 2.4276246 0.0008 Yes
β 8 −0.2435870 0.7418 No
β 9 8.9704529 0.9409 No
Table 4-43: Regression Analysis of Model y 38
y 38: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Construction 
product sub-category (Category 3)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.99586.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 100% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.986545, which is expectedly small than the 
R2.  This indicates that the model explains 99% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of .0002.  This is below the model 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in three statistically significant regressors (β3, β6, and β7).  The model 
estimates that: 
- The Clinger-Cohen Act influenced the percentage of contract dollars awarded in 
the specific product category via C-type contracts by 23.6%. 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via C-type contracts influenced the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via D-type 
contracts by -.7%. 
- Every 1% of contract dollars spent via D-type contracts influenced the percentage 
of contract dollars awarded in the specific product sub-category via D-type 
contracts by 2.4%. 
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented possible statistical inference between 
three of the regressors and the response variable, as detailed above.   
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Regression Model y39 
The results of the analysis of model y39 are presented in Table 4-44. 
Value
Statistically 
Significant?
R 2 0.981222
R 2adj 0.938972
ε 2.1955
0.0042 Yes
Parameters Estimate p -value
β 0 −13.0952100 0.3612 No
β 1 −1.4339490 0.6167 No
β 2 1.5184189 0.7581 No
β 3 13.2845330 0.0775 No
β 4 176.7278800 0.1007 No
β 5 0.0000002 0.4747 No
β 6 −0.2769870 0.1092 No
β 7 0.8254966 0.0510 No
β 8 0.0616492 0.9410 No
β 9 −279.2229000 0.0966 No
Table 4-44: Regression Analysis of Model y 39
y 39: Percentage of Air Force contract dollars 
awarded via D-type contracts in the Research & 
Development product sub-category (Category 4)
p -value of the F -statistic
Parameter Characteristics
 
Analysis of the Multiple Correlation Coefficent (R2).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2 of 0.981222.  When viewed alone, this indicates 
that the model explains 98% of the variance in the data. 
Analysis of the Adjusted Correlation Coefficient (R2adj).  As presented in the table, the 
analysis of this model resulted in an R2adj of 0.938972, which is expectedly smaller than 
the R2.  This indicates that the model explains 94% of the variance in the data, even after 
being adjusted by the model’s degrees of freedom. 
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Analysis of the p-value of the F-statistic.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in a p-value of the F-statistic of 0.0042.  This is below the model’s 
rejection threshold of 0.05, which indicates that at least one of the model’s coefficients is 
not equal to zero. 
Analysis of the Parameter Characteristics.  As presented in the table, the analysis of 
this model resulted in no statistically significant regressors.   
Overall Model Analysis.  This model presented no statistical inference between the 
regressors and the response variable.     
Testing the Hypotheses 
After each regression model was analyzed, their results were paired with their 
corresponding hypotheses.  Each hypothesis was tested based on the statistical 
significance of the appropriate regressors.  If the regressors were found to be significant 
(i.e. the p-value of their parameter estimates were below 0.05), than they were deemed to 
have had an effect on the corresponding response variable.  Following are the results of 
the hypotheses tests.  
Hypothesis 1.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the Air Force’s use of C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression 
analysis of Model y1 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that 
acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the Air Force’s use of C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 2.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the Air Force’s use of D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression 
analysis of Model y2 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that 
acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the Air Force’s use of D-type contracts. 
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Hypothesis 3.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses.  Analysis 
of the data through regression analysis of Model y3 revealed that there is insufficient 
evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage 
of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses. 
Hypothesis 4.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type 
contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y4 revealed that 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change 
in the percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type 
contracts.  Specifically identified in regression model y4 was that both the DAWIA and 
the Clinger-Cohen Act has a statistically significant positive impact on the percentage of 
Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 5.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type 
contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y5 revealed that 
there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a 
change in the percentage of Air Force contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-
type contracts. 
Hypothesis 6.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment contract dollars awarded to 
small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
Model y6 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform 
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initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 7.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing 
contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
through regression analysis of Model y7 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air 
Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 8.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Systems contract dollars 
awarded to small business via C-type contracts. Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y8 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that 
acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Supplies & 
Equipment: Systems contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 9.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y9 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that 
acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Supplies & 
Equipment: Aircraft Components contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type 
contracts. 
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Hypothesis 10.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar 
Equipment contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  
Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y10 revealed that there is 
insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the 
percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 11.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components 
contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
through regression analysis of Model y11 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air 
Force Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 12.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
through regression analysis of Model y12 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air 
Force Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 13.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases contract dollars awarded to small 
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business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
Model y13 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform 
initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases contract 
dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 14.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Professional Services contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y14 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Professional Services contract dollars awarded to small businesses via 
C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 15.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars awarded to 
small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
Model y15 revealed that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an acquisition reform 
initiative effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts.  Specifically identified 
in regression model y15 was that the FASA had a statistically significant negative impact 
on the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 16.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services 
contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
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through regression analysis of Model y16 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air 
Force Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 17.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y17 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment contract dollars awarded to small businesses via 
C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 18.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor 
Operated Parts Stores contract dollars awarded to small business via C-type 
contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y18 revealed that 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change 
in the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor 
Operated Parts Stores contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts.  
Specifically identified in regression model y18 was that the Clinger-Cohen Act had a 
statistically significant positive impact and that the Far part 15 Re-write had a statistically 
significant negative impact on the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: 
Government Owned Contractor Operated Parts Stores contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via C-type contracts. 
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Hypothesis 19.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y19 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 20.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases contract 
dollars awarded to small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y20 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases contract dollars awarded to small businesses 
via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 21.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded to small business 
via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y21 
revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives 
effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 22.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Research & Development contract dollars awarded to 
small business via C-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
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Model y22 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform 
initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Research & Development 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via C-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 23.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment contract dollars awarded to 
small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
Model y23 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform 
initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 24.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing 
contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
through regression analysis of Model y24 revealed that there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that an acquisition reform initiative effected a change in the percentage of Air 
Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via D-type contracts.  Specifically identified in regression model y24 was 
that the Clinger-Cohen Act had a statistically significant negative impact on the 
percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing contract 
dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 25.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Systems contract dollars 
awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y25 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
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that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Supplies & Equipment: Systems contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type 
contracts. 
Hypothesis 26.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y26 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 27.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar 
Equipment contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  
Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y27 revealed that there is 
insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the 
percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 28.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components 
contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
through regression analysis of Model y28 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air 
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Force Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 29.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment 
contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
through regression analysis of Model y29 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air 
Force Supplies & Equipment: Other Supplies & Equipment contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 30.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases contract dollars awarded to small 
business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
Model y30 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform 
initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases contract 
dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 31.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Professional Services contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y31 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Professional Services contract dollars awarded to small businesses via 
D-type contracts. 
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Hypothesis 32.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars awarded to 
small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
Model y32 revealed that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an acquisition reform 
initiative effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts.  Specifically identified 
in regression model y32 was that the DAWIA had a statistically significant positive 
impact on the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars 
awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 33.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services 
contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data 
through regression analysis of Model y33 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air 
Force Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 34.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y34 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment contract dollars awarded to small businesses via 
D-type contracts. 
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Hypothesis 35.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor 
Operated Parts Stores contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type 
contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y35 revealed that 
there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform initiatives effected a 
change in the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor 
Operated Parts Stores contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 36.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y36 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 37.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases contract 
dollars awarded to small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through 
regression analysis of Model y37 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest 
that acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Other Services & Leases contract dollars awarded to small businesses 
via D-type contracts. 
Hypothesis 38.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded to small business 
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via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of Model y38 
revealed that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that an acquisition reform initiative 
effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via D-type contracts.  Specifically identified in regression model y38 was 
that the Clinger-Cohen Act had a statistically significant positive impact on the 
percentage of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-
type contracts. 
Hypothesis 39.  Acquisition reform initiatives changed (increased or decreased) 
the percentage of Air Force Research & Development contract dollars awarded to 
small business via D-type contracts.  Analysis of the data through regression analysis of 
Model y39 revealed that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that acquisition reform 
initiatives effected a change in the percentage of Air Force Research & Development 
contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Results of the Trend Analysis 
This section details the results of the analyses of small business utilization via 
selected contract types and by selected product categories.  Presented will be comparative 
trend data by contract type; then, comparative trend data by contract type in the product 
categories.   
Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types Trends 
Contract 
Type 1990 2003 Change Trend Minimum Maximum Average
Standard 
Deviation
All 7.5 8.2 0.7 0.15 7.5 11.7 10.2 1.4
C-Type 18.0 6.6 -11.4 -1.16 6.6 30.2 14.8 6.7
D-Type 22.0 12.0 -10.0 -0.63 12.0 23.1 18.8 3.0
Table 4-45: Small Business Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types
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Table 4-45 presents the Air Force’s small business utilization trend data in both C-
type and D-type contracts as well as a total for all DD-350 actions.  Over the researched 
period, total SB participation rose to as high as 11.7% and varied by as much as 1.4%, 
while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 30.2% and 23.1% and 
varied by as much as 6.7% and 3.0%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 
ended above its minimum and at just below its average for the period, SB participation 
via the two contract types ended the period with their lowest recorded rates.  A least 
squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a positive trend for overall SB 
participation and negative trends for SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts. 
Small Business Utilization in Selected Contract Types by Product Categories Trends 
Table 4-46 presents the Air Force’s small business utilization trend data in Product 
Category 1 in both C-type and D-type contracts as well as a total for all DD-350 actions.   
Product 
Category
Contract 
Type 1990 2003 Change Trend Minimum Maximum Average
Standard 
Deviation
1 All 4.7 5.1 0.3 0.02 4.7 7.1 5.8 0.7
C-Type 13.6 3.4 -10.2 -1.12 3.4 27.6 8.5 6.9
D-Type 13.9 8.8 -5.1 -0.85 8.7 26.5 15.3 5.2
1A All 11.5 6.6 -5.0 -1.39 6.6 30.8 17.5 8.4
C-Type 46.8 7.7 -39.1 -3.67 1.4 46.8 23.9 18.7
D-Type 6.5 9.4 2.9 -1.55 6.5 44.7 22.7 12.1
1B All 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.02 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.3
C-Type 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.03 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.4
D-Type 22.2 1.6 -20.6 -2.42 0.0 100.0 13.0 25.1
1C All 9.1 11.1 2.0 -0.11 7.9 15.9 11.0 2.5
C-Type 33.0 15.7 -17.3 -1.93 8.1 41.0 20.6 10.2
D-Type 21.8 7.2 -14.6 -1.34 3.5 37.0 18.4 9.3
1D All 2.0 4.7 2.8 0.06 2.0 6.7 4.9 1.2
C-Type 5.4 1.4 -4.0 -0.43 1.4 16.9 6.0 3.9
D-Type 8.3 6.7 -1.5 -0.72 2.7 26.8 10.3 6.8
1E All 3.3 2.9 -0.4 -0.01 2.5 9.0 4.4 1.8
C-Type 44.9 4.7 -40.2 -2.96 4.3 51.1 21.0 16.7
D-Type 10.0 2.2 -7.7 -0.51 1.5 10.0 5.4 3.1
1 Other All 9.5 14.8 5.3 0.42 7.2 18.8 13.7 2.8
C-Type 25.1 10.7 -14.4 -1.18 7.5 32.9 14.5 6.9
D-Type 19.6 21.8 2.2 0.31 19.6 35.3 27.3 4.8
Table 4-46: SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Category 1
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Product Category 1: Supplies & Equipment.  Over the researched period, total SB 
participation rose to as high as 7.1% and varied by as much as .7%, while SB 
participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 27.6% and 26.5% and varied by as 
much as 6.9% and 5.2%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 ended above 
its minimum and at just below its average for the period, SB participation via C-type 
contracts ended the period with its lowest recorded rate.  A least squares regression line 
fitted through the data indicates a positive trend for overall SB participation and negative 
trends for SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 1A: Supplies & Equipment: Automated Data Processing 
Equipment.  Over the researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 30.8% 
and varied by as much as 8.4%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts 
reached 46.8% and 44.7% and varied by as much as 18.7% and 12.1%, respectively.  
While total SB participation in 2003 ended at its minimum value, SB participation via the 
two contract types ended the period above their lowest recorded rates.  A least squares 
regression line fitted through the data indicates a negative trend for overall SB 
participation, SB participation via C-type contracts, and SB participation via D-type 
contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 1B: Supplies & Equipment: Systems.  Over the researched 
period, total SB participation rose to as high as 1.1% and varied by as much as .3%, while 
SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 1.0% and 100.0% and varied by 
as much as .4% and 25.1%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 ended 
above its minimum and its average for the period, SB participation via the two contract 
types ended the period at or just above their lowest recorded rates.  A least squares 
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regression line fitted through the data indicates a positive trend for overall SB 
participation and SB participation via C-type contracts and a negative trend for SB 
participation via D-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 1C: Supplies & Equipment: Aircraft Components.  Over the 
researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 15.9% and varied by as much 
as 2.5%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 41.0% and 
37.0% and varied by as much as 10.2% and 9.3%, respectively.  Total SB participation in 
2003 ended above its minimum and at just above its average for the period.  SB 
participation via the two contract types also ended the period above their minimum, but 
below their average.  A least squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a 
negative trend for overall SB participation, SB participation via C-type contracts, and SB 
participation via D-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 1D: Supplies & Equipment: Communication & Radar 
Equipment.  Over the researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 6.7% 
and varied by as much as 1.2%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts 
reached 16.9% and 26.8% and varied by as much as 3.9% and 6.8%, respectively.  While 
total SB participation in 2003 ended above its minimum and at just below its average for 
the period, SB participation via C-type contracts ended the period with its lowest 
recorded rate.  A least squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a positive 
trend for overall SB participation and negative trends for SB participation via C-type and 
D-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 1E: Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components.  Over the 
researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 9.0% and varied by as much as 
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1.8%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 51.1% and 10.0% 
and varied by as much as 16.7% and 3.1%, respectively.  Total SB participation, SB 
participation via C-type contracts, and SB participation via D-type contracts ended above 
their minimum values and below their average values for the period.  A least squares 
regression line fitted through the data indicates a negative trend for overall SB 
participation, SB participation via C-type contracts, and SB participation via D-type 
contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 1 Other: Supplies & Equipment: Other.  Over the researched 
period, total SB participation rose to as high as 18.8% and varied by as much as 2.8%, 
while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 32.9% and 35.3% and 
varied by as much as 6.9% and 4.8%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 
ended above its minimum and its average for the period, SB participation via the two 
contract types ended the period between their lowest and average recorded rates.  A least 
squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a positive trend for overall SB 
participation and SB participation via D-type contracts and a negative trend for SB 
participation via C-type contracts. 
Table 4-47 presents the Air Force’s small business utilization trend data in Product 
Category 2 in both C-type and D-type contracts as well as a total for all DD-350 actions.   
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Product 
Category
Contract 
Type 1990 2003 Change Trend Minimum Maximum Average
Standard 
Deviation
2 All 13.4 18.2 4.8 0.22 12.6 18.2 13.9 1.3
C-Type 12.4 7.3 -5.0 -0.23 7.3 19.4 14.1 3.3
D-Type 22.8 14.6 -8.2 -0.38 14.6 22.8 16.9 2.0
2A All 13.4 15.4 2.0 0.27 13.4 20.9 16.7 2.3
C-Type 14.5 22.2 7.8 0.43 4.8 34.9 19.6 7.6
D-Type 41.4 16.7 -24.6 -1.45 16.6 41.4 26.4 6.7
2B All 5.0 15.3 10.3 0.31 3.2 15.3 5.4 2.9
C-Type 26.8 8.6 -18.2 -1.82 2.4 51.1 15.8 13.2
D-Type 7.7 24.0 16.3 0.55 2.9 24.0 5.9 5.2
2C All 62.5 33.7 -28.8 -1.15 33.7 62.5 47.6 8.2
C-Type 62.5 43.0 -19.5 -0.62 40.7 62.5 49.9 5.4
D-Type 82.0 25.0 -57.0 -3.77 25.0 82.0 58.2 17.3
2D All 5.9 7.2 1.2 0.25 5.5 11.8 7.5 2.0
C-Type 3.6 10.6 7.0 -0.32 2.8 22.1 10.5 6.6
D-Type 8.3 6.1 -2.3 0.02 6.1 19.8 10.7 3.1
2E All 3.8 14.8 10.9 1.11 3.8 17.9 10.3 4.7
C-Type 1.7 15.7 14.0 -1.85 1.7 69.2 21.4 18.4
D-Type 0.3 28.5 28.2 2.20 0.1 28.5 9.1 9.5
2F All 4.4 3.3 -1.1 -0.07 0.6 9.4 3.9 2.5
C-Type 3.7 3.0 -0.7 0.10 0.3 17.0 3.9 4.9
D-Type 0.4 3.8 3.5 0.02 0.4 12.8 3.6 3.2
2 Other All 24.1 8.2 -15.9 -0.98 8.2 24.1 15.3 4.2
C-Type 14.8 2.5 -12.3 -1.30 2.5 50.7 12.0 11.1
D-Type 32.3 22.2 -10.1 -0.76 14.4 32.3 19.9 4.6
Table 4-47: SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Category 2
 
Product Category 2: Services & Leases.  Over the researched period, total SB 
participation rose to as high as 18.2% and varied by as much as 1.3%, while SB 
participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 19.4% and 22.8% and varied by as 
much as 3.3% and 2.0%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 ended at its 
maximum rate for the period, SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts ended the 
period with their lowest recorded rate.  A least squares regression line fitted through the 
data indicates a positive trend for overall SB participation and negative trends for SB 
participation via C-type and D-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 2A: Services & Leases: Professional Services.  Over the 
researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 20.9% and varied by as much 
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as 2.3%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 34.9% and 
41.4% and varied by as much as 7.6% and 6.7%, respectively.  While total SB 
participation in 2003 ended at just below its average rate for the period, SB participation 
via C-type contracts ended the period with a higher than average rate and SB 
participation via D-type contracts ended the period with just higher than its lowest 
recorded rate.  A least squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a positive 
trend for overall SB participation and SB participation via C-type contracts and a 
negative trends for SB participation via D-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 2B: Services & Leases: Utilities.  Over the researched period, 
total SB participation rose to as high as 15.3% and varied by as much as 2.9%, while SB 
participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 51.1% and 24.0% and varied by as 
much as 13.2% and 5.2%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 ended at 
just below its average rate for the period, SB participation via C-type and D-type 
contracts ended the period at or just higher than their minimum recorded rate.  A least 
squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a positive trend for overall SB 
participation and SB participation via D-type contracts and a negative trends for SB 
participation via C-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 2C: Services & Leases: Base Operating Support Services.  
Over the researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 62.5% and varied by 
as much as 8.2%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 62.5% 
and 82.0% and varied by as much as 5.4% and 17.3%, respectively.  While total SB 
participation in 2003 and SB participation via D-type contracts ended at their minimum 
rate for the period, SB participation via C-type contracts ended the period just higher than 
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its lowest recorded rate.  A least squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a 
negative trend for overall SB participation, SB participation via C-type contracts, and SB 
participation via D-type contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 2D: Services & Leases: Repair of Equipment.  Over the 
researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 11.8% and varied by as much 
as 2.0%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 22.1% and 
19.8% and varied by as much as 6.6% and 3.1%, respectively.  While total SB 
participation in 2003 ended at just below its average rate for the period, SB participation 
via C-type contracts ended above its average rate and SB participation via D-type 
contracts ended at its minimum recorded rate.  A least squares regression line fitted 
through the data indicates a positive trend for overall SB participation and SB 
participation via D-type contracts and a negative trends for SB participation via C-type 
contracts. 
Product Sub-Category 2E: Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor 
Operated Parts Stores.  Over the researched period, total SB participation rose to as high 
as 17.9% and varied by as much as 4.7%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type 
contracts reached 69.2% and 28.5% and varied by as much as 18.4% and 9.5%, 
respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 ended above its average rate for the 
period, SB participation via C-type contracts ended just below its average rate and SB 
participation via D-type contracts ended at its maximum recorded rate.  A least squares 
regression line fitted through the data indicates a positive trend for overall SB 
participation and SB participation via D-type contracts and a negative trends for SB 
participation via C-type contracts. 
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Product Sub-Category 2F: Services & Leases: Modification of Equipment.  Over the 
researched period, total SB participation rose to as high as 9.4% and varied by as much as 
2.5%, while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 17.0% and 12.8% 
and varied by as much as 4.9% and 3.2%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 
2003 and SB participation via C-type contracts ended just below its average rate for the 
period, SB participation via D-type contracts ended just above its average rate.  A least 
squares regression line fitted through the data indicates a negative trend for overall SB 
participation and SB participation via C-type contracts and a positive trend for SB 
participation via D-type contracts 
Product Sub-Category 2 Other: Services & Leases: Other.  Over the researched 
period, total SB participation rose to as high as 24.1% and varied by as much as 4.2%, 
while SB participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 50.7% and 32.3% and 
varied by as much as 11.1% and 4.6%, respectively.  Total SB participation in 2003 and 
SB participation via C-type contracts ended at their minimum rate for the period, SB 
participation via D-type contracts ended just above its average rate.  A least squares 
regression line fitted through the data indicates a negative trend for overall SB 
participation, SB participation via C-type contracts, and SB participation via D-type 
contracts 
Table 4-48 presents the Air Force’s small business utilization trend data in Product 
Categories 2 and 3 in both C-type and D-type contracts as well as a total for all DD-350 
actions.   
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Product 
Category
Contract 
Type 1990 2003 Change Trend Minimum Maximum Average
Standard 
Deviation
3 All 60.4 49.4 -11.0 -0.29 49.4 67.7 59.5 5.0
C-Type 67.2 52.9 -14.3 0.10 33.9 74.0 61.4 10.6
D-Type 89.8 46.3 -43.4 -1.96 46.3 89.8 59.3 11.9
4 All 4.4 12.6 8.2 0.48 4.4 12.6 7.7 2.1
C-Type 17.7 13.5 -4.2 -0.70 6.8 30.6 15.2 7.5
D-Type 27.7 8.3 -19.3 -1.31 8.3 27.7 19.2 6.2
Table 4-48: SB Percentage Trend in Selected Contract Types & Product Categories 3 & 4
 
Product Category 3: Construction.  Over the researched period, total SB participation 
rose to as high as 67.7% and varied by as much as 5.0%, while SB participation via C-
type and D-type contracts reached 74.0% and 89.9% and varied by as much as 10.6% and 
11.9%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 and SB participation in D-type 
contracts ended at their minimum rates for the period, SB participation via D-type 
contracts ended the period just below its average recorded rate.  A least squares 
regression line fitted through the data indicates a negative trend for overall SB 
participation, SB participation via C-type contracts, and SB participation via D-type 
contracts. 
Product Category 4: Research & Development.  Over the researched period, total SB 
participation rose to as high as 12.6% and varied by as much as 2.1%, while SB 
participation via C-type and D-type contracts reached 30.6% and 27.7% and varied by as 
much as 7.5% and 6.2%, respectively.  While total SB participation in 2003 and ended at 
its maximum rate for the period, SB participation via C-type contracts ended the period 
just below its average recorded rate and SB participation via D-type contracts ended the 
period at its minimum rate.  A least squares regression line fitted through the data 
indicates a positive trend for overall SB participation, and a negative trend for SB 
participation via C-type and D-type contracts. 
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Summary 
This chapter detailed the analysis performed on the data.  It presented the data 
included for regression and trend analysis and discussed the analyses in detail.  Chapter 5 
will discuss conclusions of the analysis and recommendations. 
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V.  Conclusions & Recommendations 
 
Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the results of the thesis.  First, it reviews the research 
problem. Next, it discusses the results of the research as applied to the research and 
investigative questions.  Then, it discusses the limitations of the results of the analysis.  
Finally, it recommends suggested topics for future research. 
Review of the Research Problem 
This thesis began with a question of the health of the Air Force small business 
program.  Specifically, it asked for insight into the involvement of small businesses in Air 
Force procurement.  With the breadth of these overall quandaries being quite large, the 
objectives of this research were narrowed so as to provide a picture of how the Air Force 
procures (contract types) and what the Air Force procures (product areas).   
The study asked the question of what could affect changes in how and what the AF 
procures.  It identified several pieces of legislation and related procurement initiatives 
(acquisition reform), types of procurement vehicles (contract types), and common 
product areas.  This study asked if the identified initiatives changed the AF’s use of 
procurement vehicles; then, further asked if identified changes impacted small business 
participation.  Then, this study asked if the identified initiatives changed the AF’s use of 
procurement vehicles in common product areas.  Also, it asked for the identification of 
trends in contract type/product area utilization.  Finally, it asked for the identification of a 
more pointed measure of small business participation other than percent of total 
obligations. 
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Discussion of Results 
This section will discuss the results of the research as they apply to the research and 
investigative questions.  The discussion will comment on the results and discuss their 
possible meaning and implications. The regression models used for Research Question 1 
and Investigative Question 1 each had the capacity to yield three different results: 1) one 
or more statistically significant regressors, 2) no statistically significant regressors, or 3) a 
failed model (i.e. the model was unable to calculate a regression line using the given 
data).  Only the third result can be considered to have no significant input to the posed 
hypotheses as it fails to provide any insight into the regressor/response relationship 
whatsoever.  The first two possibilities, however, lend the statistical results necessary to 
either accept or reject the hypotheses. The failure of any given regression model to yield 
a statistically significant regressor is not a failure of the model itself.  That a given 
regressor is not statistically significant within the model is a successful answer. 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 asked if acquisition reform initiatives affected a change in small 
business utilization or the Air Force’s use of procurement vehicles and, if so, what has 
been the impact to small business utilization?   
 Research revealed that there was little correlation between acquisition reform 
initiatives and the AF’s use of either tested contract type or the percentage of AF contract 
dollars awarded to small businesses.  Only one model (y4) provided enough evidence to 
suggest that two acquisition reform initiatives (the DAWIA and the Clinger-Cohen Act) 
positively affected the percentage of C-type contract dollars awarded to small businesses.  
One model, however, failed to effectively analyze the data.  Regression Model y1 could 
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not complete a strait line through the responses; therefore, the result of this model is that 
one must come to the same conclusion as if the model revealed no statistically significant 
regressors. 
These results are telling in that they reveal how little influence acquisition reform 
initiatives had on the Air Force’s use of these two contract types and the overall ability of 
small businesses to compete for Air Force contract dollars.  Only two of the acquisition 
reform initiatives were found to have had a statistically significant impact and that impact 
was positive.  Overall, the tested acquisition reforms and SB participation in AF 
contracting are mutually exclusive.   
Investigative Question 1 
Investigative Question 1 asked if acquisition reform initiatives effected a change in 
the Air Force’s use of contract types to procure goods and services in selected product 
categories. 
Research revealed that there was some correlation between acquisition reform 
initiatives and the AF’s use of either tested contract type to procure goods and services in 
the selected product categories. This research revealed the following results: 
- The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act possibly increased the 
percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars awarded to 
small businesses via D-type contracts. 
- The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act possibly decreased the percentage of 
Air Force Services & Leases: Utilities contract dollars awarded to small 
businesses via D-type contracts. 
- The Clinger-Cohen Act possibly: 
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 - Increased the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: Government Owned 
Contractor Operated Parts Stores contract dollars awarded to small business 
via D-type contracts. 
 - Decreased the percentage of Air Force Supplies & Equipment: Automated 
Data Processing contract dollars awarded to small business via D-type 
contracts. 
 - Increased the percentage of Air Force Construction contract dollars awarded 
to small business via D-type contracts. 
- The FAR Part 15 Re-write possibly decreased the percentage of Air Force 
Services & Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated parts Stores contract 
dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
- The proportion of Air Force procurement dollars awarded via Multiple Award 
Contracts possibly increased the percentage of Air Force Services & Leases: 
Utilities contract dollars awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
- The proportion of Air Force procurement dollars awarded via Government-Wide 
Agency Contracts possibly increased the percentage of Air Force Services & 
Leases: Government Owned Contractor Operated parts Stores contract dollars 
awarded to small businesses via D-type contracts. 
Interesting to note is that via at least one of the two selected contract types, each of 
the six acquisition reform initiatives effected a statistically significant change in the Air 
Force’s small business utilization rate and that this change in small business utilization 
occurred in only four of the 15 product categories/subcategories.  As identified above, the 
categories/subcategories affected were: 
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- Automated Data Processing Equipment: Decreased via D-type contracts by the 
Clinger-Cohen Act 
- Utilities: Decreased via C-type contracts by FASA, but increased via C- and D-
type contracts by DAWIA the use of MACs. 
- Government-Owned Contractor-Operated Parts Stores: Decreased via C-type 
contracts by the FAR 15 Re-write, but increased via C-type contracts by the 
Clinger-Cohen Act and the use of GWACs. 
- Construction: Increased via D-type contracts by the Clinger-Cohen Act. 
Investigative Question 1a 
Investigative Question 1a asked to what extent the Air Force used firm fixed-price 
contracts (C-type) & indefinite delivery (D-type) contracts to procure goods and services 
from small businesses between the years of 1990 to present.  To answer this question, SB 
participation via the two contract types was compared with overall SB participation.  The 
results of this comparison are as follows: 
- The trend of overall SB participation indicates an increase in participation. 
- The trend of SB participation via C-type contracts indicates a decrease in 
participation. 
- The trend of SB participation via D-type contracts indicates a decrease in 
participation. 
This analysis revealed that although the trend is toward less small business 
participation via the two researched contract types, overall small business participation is 
increasing.  This possibly indicates a shift in the preference of small businesses to bid on 
other contract types, the preference of the AF to contract via other contract types, or both.  
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Although the regression analysis of model y3 was primarily performed to test the effect of 
acquisition reform initiatives on small business utilization, it also revealed that the 
proportion of C-type and D-type contracts awarded by the AF did not have a statistically 
significant effect on overall small business participation.  This indicates that possible 
efforts to increase small business participation via these contract types would have a 
negligible effect on overall small business participation.   
Missing in the analysis, however, is any indication of why small business 
participation changed (overall and via the two contract types) and from where the 
increased overall small business participation came.  Combining the results of the 
hypotheses posed in the other research/investigative questions and the results of this 
investigative question seem to indicate that, whatever the trend in small business 
participation, it was probably not caused by AR initiatives. 
Investigative Question 1b 
Investigative Question 1b asked to what extent the Air Force used firm fixed-price 
contracts (C-type) & indefinite delivery (D-type) contracts to procure goods and services 
in selected product categories from small businesses between the years of 1990 to 
present.  To answer this question, SB participation via the two contract types was 
compared with overall SB participation in each of the product areas.  The results of this 
comparison are presented in Chapter 4. 
The review of the analyses for the selected product categories revealed somewhat 
similar results as the review conducted for Investigative Question 1.  Three of the four 
product categories (Supplies & Equipment, Services & Leases, and Research & 
Development) experienced a positive trend in small business participation, but a negative 
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trend in small business participation via both of the selected contract types.  Again, this 
seems to indicate a shift in small business utilization in the product categories via 
contract types other than those researched for this study, but, again, the cause of this shift 
is unknown. 
Review of specific product subcategories also revealed several areas in which the 
trend in small business participation dropped overall and via both of the selected contract 
types.  Among the Supplies & Equipment subcategories, this rate of decrease was greater 
(more negative trend) for both C- and D-type contracts than it was for the overall 
subcategory.  This, again, indicates a shift in small business participation from these 
contract types to other contract types but, again, the cause of this shift is unknown. 
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 asked what alternative measures of small business participation 
can be employed to effectively evaluate performance outside of percentage of total 
obligations.  This question is based on the widely-held view that the current measure of 
the small business program’s performance, percent of total obligations, provides policy-
makers with limited insight into small business participation in government contracting.  
Percent of total obligations is a broad metric that provides the aggregate measure of small 
business participation across many different industries, from office supplies to weapon 
systems.  It provides no expanded insight. 
As revealed in the literature review, the last decade of legislation reflects a Congress 
(and, therefore a voter base) interested in controlling the ballooning costs of Government 
procurement and tracking the performance and results of expensive Government 
programs.  In the interest of ensuring small business participation while complying with 
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legislation designed to reduce government spend, the AFSADBU seeks insight into the 
effects that previous government programs (or acquisition reforms) have had on small 
business utilization and target area for future small business utilization efforts.   
At the very least, the efforts of this thesis revealed just how varied small business 
participation in AF procurement has been over the past 13 fiscal years.  Yearly small 
business participation in individual product areas reached as high as 67.7% (Construction 
in 2002) and as low as 0.1% (Systems in 6 out of 13 years), while the aggregate small 
business percentage measure ranged from 7.5% to 11.7%.  Clearly, small businesses 
participate in AF procurement at different levels in different product areas. 
From a common sense perspective, product areas experiencing a decline in small 
business participation would seem to require a more targeted effort than product areas 
experiencing an increase in small business participation.  Table 5-1 lists the trends in 
small business participation in the researched product areas and is a derivation of Tables 
4-45, 4-46, and 4-47, which were accomplished for analysis under Investigative 
Questions 1a and 1b.  It identifies those product areas which have experienced a negative 
trend in small business participation over the researched period.  The trend itself is 
identified as the slope of the least squares regression line calculated through the yearly 
percentages of small business participation in the stated product categories.   
Product Category Trend
All 0.15
1A -1.39
1C -0.11
1E -0.01
2C -1.15
2F -0.07
2 Other -0.98
3 -0.29
Table 5-1: SB Participation Trends (FY1990 thru FY 2003)
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Overall, the positive trend of small business participation in all product categories 
indicates that between 1990 and 2003, small business participation increased.  A 
simplified view of this trend line may lead to the expectation that FY 2004 small business 
participation would be 0.15% greater than in 2003.  This simplified view has very little 
statistical accuracy, however, and should not be used for projecting future small business 
participation rates.  This table merely reflects an observed strait-line trend and indicates 
possible product categories in which small businesses have been loosing procurement 
ground. 
As stated, the trend values indicated in the table are the slope of the trend lines.  A 
smaller trend value indicates a product category in which SB participation has been 
dropping the most (large negative slope) and a larger trend value indicates a product 
category in which SB participation has been dropping the least (small negative slope).  
For example, SB participation in product category 1A (Supplies & Equipment: 
Automated Data Processing) is decreasing at a rate of 1.39% per year and SB 
participation in product category 1E (Supplies & Equipment: Engines & Components) is 
decreasing at a rate of only .01% per year. 
What the exploration of this research question revealed was not a complex new 
measurement of small business participation, but the need to employ the current 
measurement at a finer level of detail.  The overall measure, Percent of Total Obligations, 
reveals little of the true variations in small business participation.  Although there are a 
few industry-focused small business recruiting and training efforts, such as the SBIR 
Program or the Manufacturing Technical Assistance Production Program, most 
government-wide, congressionally-reported small business recruiting efforts focus on the 
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type of small business being recruited (e.g. small disadvantaged, woman-owned, etc.), 
not the industry in which the small business operates.  The industries identified in Table 
5-1 need help developing and maintaining small business involvement. 
Contributions of the Research 
This research serves to settle at least a few questions regarding the effect of AR 
initiatives on SB participation in AF contracting.  Shown in this research is that, except 
within a few select product areas, only a few causal relationships between SB 
participation and AR initiatives can be made.  AR initiatives have not driven down SB 
participation.  In fact, the research provides evidence that, where AR initiatives effected 
SB participation, they did so positively in three out of five product areas.  The research 
also shows that two of the perceived SB participation killers, MACs and GWACs, have 
only positively effected SB participation. 
Limitations of the Research 
This study is limited in its application in several ways.  First, this study specifically 
excluded all AF contract actions below $25,000.  Second, since data were compiled at the 
AF-level, the results of this study should only be applied at that level (not command-level 
or base-level).  Third, this study linked several acquisition reform initiatives with several 
response variables.  One must remember that these links imply correlation, not causation.  
Finally, none of the regression models accomplished in this study are suitable for 
projecting future response values. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This study revealed several areas in which future research could prove helpful to 
small business participation efforts.  Suggested research as follows: 
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- Employ the regression models built in this thesis to data points aggregated at a 
level lower than total AF (e.g. data points at major command-level, base-level, or 
contracting office-level). 
- Test the regression models built in this thesis with data collected for FY 2004. 
- Develop weighted measures of the small business utilization trends.  For example, 
it may be more appropriate to weight the small business utilization values 
depending upon their age.  Recent utilization rates should possibly be weighted 
more than older utilization rates.  
- Develop regression models to test the interactive effects contract type usage with 
small business participation within the contract types and as a whole. 
Conclusion 
This chapter summarized the results of the thesis.  It reviewed the research problem, 
discussed the results of the research as applied to the research and investigative questions, 
discussed the limitations of the results of the analysis, and recommended topics for future 
related research. 
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Appendix A: Data Collection and Organization 
The Air Force stores its contract award information in the J001, Database of 
Procurement Actions.  Each contract award, or reported DD Form 350, is called an 
“action.”  Each search of the J001 is called a query.  As a relational database, the J001 
stores actions that are accessible/searchable by limiting queries with filters, such as 
filtering by the date of award, by the contract type, by any other entry in any block of the 
DD Form 350, or by combinations of entries and blocks. 
Results of J001 queries are output as Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.  Each query 
results in a separate spreadsheet.  Each spreadsheet contains a header row and multiple 
data rows.  Each header cell contains text identifying the content of the cells under it.  
Each row contains the queried information specific to one action. 
For example, the J001 could be queried for all actions awarded in fiscal year 2001 via 
definitive contracts.  Besides the limiting factors, one would have to specifically select 
the output data, such as each action’s dollar amount, date of award, Contracting Office 
Code, and contract type.  The result of the query would be an Excel spreadsheet with a 
header row of cells labeled (in selectable order): B8, B3, A3B, and B13A, where B8 = 
Obligated or Deobligated Dollars, B3 = Action Date, A3B = Contracting Office Code, 
and B13A = Contract or Order.  Because the query was limited to definitive contract 
actions in fiscal year 2001, for each action, or row, the cell under the column header 
B13A would read “3,” for Definitive Contract, and the cells under the column header B3 
would read between 20001001 and 20010930, with the date format “yyyymmdd.” 
Output data can also be calculated.  For instance, in the above example, one of the 
output data was Block B8, Obligated or Deobligated Dollars.  This data is stored as a 
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whole, positive number—one would not know from this block alone whether or not this 
action obligated funds or deobligated funds.  For a complete picture, one would also have 
to query block B7, Type Obligation.  Stored in this block is one of three codes: 1, if the 
action was an obligation; 2, if the action was a deobligation; or 3, if the action was for 
zero dollars.  To simplify the output report, a calculated output field can be added to the 
query such that Block B8 is compared with Block B7 and the output field is the positive 
or negative dollar value of the action. 
To complete the necessary analysis, several queries will be required.  As the raw data 
in this study is expected to be quite large (one row of data for each Air Force contracting 
action between 1990 and 2002), several queries will no doubt be necessary as Microsoft 
excel limits the number of available rows per spreadsheet to 65,536 (Excel 2002, 2001).  
Whether it is by fiscal year, major command, operational contracting office, or other such 
grouping, the factor of interest for each query will be left to the expertise of the query 
generator. 
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